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Abstract 
We use subjects’ actions in modified dictator games to perform a within subject classification of 
individuals  into  four  different  types  of  interdependent  preferences:  Selfish,  Social  Welfare 
maximizers, Inequity Averse and Competitive. We elicit beliefs about other subjects’ actions in 
the same modified dictator games to test how much of the existent heterogeneity in others’ 
actions is known by subjects. We find that subjects with different interdependent preferences in 
fact  have  different  beliefs  about  others’  actions.  In  particular,  Selfish  individuals  cannot 
conceive others being non Selfish while Social Welfare maximizers are closest to the actual 
distribution of others’ actions. We finally provide subjects with information on other subjects’ 
actions and re classify individuals according to their (new) actions in the same modified dictator 
games. We find that social information does not affect Selfish individuals, but that individuals 
with interdependent preferences are more likely to change their behavior and tend to behave 
more selfishly.  
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1.  Introduction 
In  the  last  twenty  years  the  experimental  literature  has  challenged  the  classic 
assumption that individuals are only motivated by their own individual material payoff, 
as they may in fact take into account the outcome of their decisions on others’ payoffs.
1 
This  evidence  has  given  rise  to  extensive  work  on  interdependent  (or  “social”) 
preferences.
2 Different preferences have been proposed. Standard “Selfish” preferences 
assume  individuals  only  care  about  their  own  material  payoff.  “Social  Welfare” 
maximizing  preferences  correspond  to  individuals  caring  positively  about  others’ 
payoffs.  “Inequity  Averse”  preferences  include  both  positive  and  negative  concerns 
about others’ payoffs depending on subjects’ relative standing. They assume individuals 
care positively about others’ payoffs when ahead (better off than others) but negatively 
when  behind  (worse off  than  others)  (Fehr  and  Schmidt  (1999)  and  Bolton  and 
Ockenfels  (2000)).  Finally,  “Competitive”  preferences  assume  individuals  care 
negatively  about  others’  payoffs.  Charness  and  Rabin  (2002)  (CR  from  here  on), 
encompass these four different models of interdependent preferences in a simple piece 
wise  linear  utility  model  with  two  parameters  that  capture  the  weight  on  others’ 
payoffs.
3 Figure 1 shows indifference curves for these four types of preferences. 
Several studies have aimed to find the interdependent utility function that explains 
best  the  distributional  choices  made  by  subjects  in  experiments  performed  in  the 
laboratory.
4 More recently, researchers have aimed to identify and quantify different 
types  of  interdependent  preferences  in  experiments  where  subjects  take  distributive 
decisions (Andreoni and Miller (2002), Blanco et al. (2007), and Fisman et al. (2007)). 
An  important  finding  of  these  studies  is  that  the  existence  of  heterogeneity  in 
interdependent preferences cannot be ignored. In particular, around half of the subjects 
                                                 
1 See Fehr and Schmidt (2000) and Sobel (2005) for comprehensive and excellent surveys. 
2  “Social  preferences”  and  “other regarding  preferences”  have  been  used  to  refer  to  distributional 
preferences  as  well  as  reciprocity  concerns.  Since  our  setting  is  non strategic  we  focus  on  purely 
distributional  preferences  and  thus  use  the  term  “interdependent  preferences”  to  refer  to  purely 
distributional  concerns.  See  also  Fisman  et  al  (2007)  for  a  discussion  on  the  difference  between 
preferences for giving and social preferences.  
3 We refer to the model presented on page 822 in Charness and Rabin (2002), where parameter q is set to 
be equal to zero (no reciprocity issues considered). Thus, there are only two relevant parameters in the 
model, r and s, the weights for others’ payoffs when ahead and behind respectively (as reproduced in our 
equation (1), section 4). It should be noted that our Social Welfare maximizer type is defined within this 
model, by setting r and s to be strictly positive. That is, it is not based on the more general Social 
Welfare maximizer model depicted in their Appendix, in which there exists a trade off between the total 
surplus and the payoff of the individual who is worst off. Charness and Grosskopf (2001) find that this 
more complicated Social Welfare maximizer represents individuals’ preferences better. 
4 See, for example, Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and Engelmann and Strobel 
(2004).   3 
in  these  experiments  behave  as  Selfish  while  a  minority  behaves  as  Competitive. 
Moreover, there exists a significant portion of subjects whose behaviour is consistent 
with both Social Welfare maximizing preferences and Inequity Aversion.  
This paper goes one step further and studies the role beliefs and knowledge about 
others’ distributional decisions (social information) play in interdependent preferences. 
Any  application  assuming  heterogeneity  of  interdependent  preferences  requires 
assumptions about individuals’ beliefs about others’ actions and thus preferences. One 
standard  assumption  in  incomplete  information  applications  is  that  preferences  are 
private knowledge but that the distribution of different preferences is commonly known. 
We elicit beliefs about others’ actions and therefore preferences, in order to test how 
much  of  this  heterogeneity  in  preferences  is  actually  known  to  the  subjects.  In 
particular, we test whether individuals with different interdependent preferences have 
indeed a different perception about the existent heterogeneity. For instance, do Selfish 
and Social Welfare maximizers expect the same behaviour from others? Furthermore, in 
purely interdependent preferences, the knowledge of this heterogeneity is assumed not 
to affect own behaviour. We provide social information in order to test whether it has 
any relevance for individual decision making. In particular, we inform subjects about 
the  distribution  of  other  decision  makers’  actions  and  we  check  whether  this 
information affects their own decision making.
5  
We depart from the current experimental literature on belief elicitation by using a 
purely decision making and therefore, non strategic setting.
6 In our experiment, subjects 
express  their  beliefs  about  actions  taken  by  other  subjects  with  whom  they  never 
interact and whose actions can never affect own payoffs. We proceeded in this way due 
to  two  reasons.  First,  this  offers  a  clean  test  for  the  role  beliefs  and  knowledge  of 
heterogeneity in others’ actions might play, if any, in purely interdependent preferences. 
Beliefs in our context can only capture uncertainty about others’ actions and therefore 
preferences. Second, non strategic environments control for issues such as intention 
based utilities, perceptions of kindness and unkindness and/or reciprocal behaviour.
7 
                                                 
5 As it will become clear in the description of the experimental design, elicited beliefs as well as social 
information are about others’ actions and not directly about others’ preferences. However, given that in 
our  experimental  design  different  preferences  yield  different  action  profiles,  these  two  concepts  are 
related.   
6 See, for example, Croson (2000), Nyarko and Schotter (2002), Costa Gomes and Weizsäcker (in press), 
Rey Biel (in press) and Ivanov (2006).  
7 Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000), Cabrales et al. (2006), Gächter and Renner (2006) and Bellemare et al. 
(in press) study beliefs in relation to interdependent preferences. However, elicited beliefs in their settings 
refer to actions taken by subjects whose choices affect own payoffs. That is, they study the effect of 
beliefs on social preferences in strategic settings.   4 
Thus, non strategic settings such as modified dictator games are an ideal bed test for 
whether  beliefs  and  social  information  are  relevant  in  modelling  other regarding 
behaviour. 
Our experimental design is a modified dictator game inspired by the designs of both 
Andreoni and Miller (2002) and Fisman et al. (2007), but it includes differences that are 
crucial for our research questions.
8 Deciders in our experiment have to choose in sixteen 
different  decision  tables  among  three  different  options  that  yield  different  payoff 
distributions for a Decider and a Receiver. The three options consist of a self payoff 
maximizing choice, a surplus creating choice, in which Deciders give up one payoff unit 
to allow the Receiver to obtain s>1 more units, and a surplus destroying choice, in 
which Deciders give up one payoff unit to destroy Receiver’s payoff in s>1 units. The 
sixteen decision tables differ on whether the Decider is better off or worse off than the 
Receiver, as well as in the number of created or destroyed units, s>1. This simple design 
allows  us  to  identify  the  four  most  prominent  types  of  interdependent  preferences 
included  in  the  CR  model  (2002):  Selfish  (SF),  Social  Welfare  maximizing  (SW), 
Inequity  Averse  (IA)  and  Competitive  (CP)  preferences.  Notice  that  a  SF  Decider 
should always choose the self payoff maximizing choice. A SW Decider should either 
choose the selfish or surplus creating action but never a surplus destroying action. An 
IA Decider on the other hand, should either choose the selfish or surplus creating action 
when being better off than the Receiver, but either the selfish or surplus destroying 
action when being worse off than the Receiver. Finally, a CP Decider should either 
choose the selfish or surplus destroying action but never a surplus creating action.
9 
The experiment consists of three parts. First, subjects take actions over the sixteen 
decision tables. Given their decision profile, we are able to perform a within subject 
classification  of  subjects  into  the  four  different  preferences types.  Second,  we  elicit 
Deciders’ beliefs about other Deciders’ actions in exactly the same sixteen decision 
tables. This allows us to identify different beliefs among the subject population and to 
                                                 
8 In Andreoni and Miller (2002)’s design subjects make choices over different budgets of payoffs between 
themselves  and  another  subject,  with  different  relative  prices  of  own payoff  and  other payoff.  Our 
modified dictator games are similar to theirs in that they also include prices for surplus creating and 
surplus destroying actions. Fisman et. al. (2007)’s design replicate Andreoni and Miller (2002)’s design 
but they also allow for step shaped budget sets, in which subjects can take Pareto damaging actions. Our 
design is similar to theirs in that it also allows for Pareto damaging behavior (our surplus destroying 
action). Our main difference with respect to these two studies resides in having only three available 
actions.  Making  the  choice  set  discrete  allows  us  to  elicit  beliefs  and  provide  information  on  other 
subjects’ actions in a simple and meaningful manner.  
9 As it will become clear later, for SW, IA and CP individuals, the choice between the selfish and the 
surplus  creating/destroying  action  may  depend  on  the  value  of  s.  For  a  detailed  explanation  of  the 
identification strategy see footnote 26.    5 
classify each individual into different belief types. We compare the preferences type 
classification with the belief type classification in order to measure how much of the 
existent heterogeneity in actions is known to the subjects and also to test for correlation 
between  their  actions  and  beliefs.  Finally,  Deciders  take  actions  over  the  sixteen 
decision tables as in the first part of the experiment, but this time, we provide them with 
information  about  the  distribution  of  choices  other  Deciders  previously  made.  This 
allows us to compare the preferences types classifications in parts one and three, in 
order to test whether social information has any influence on their decisions.  
We find a preferences type distribution very similar to those found by Andreoni and 
Miller (2002) and Fisman et al. (2007). Selfish preferences type is the most frequent 
(44%  of  the  subjects),  followed  by  Inequity  Averse  individuals  (25%)  and  Social 
Welfare  maximizers  (21%).  A  small  fraction  of  subjects  is  classified  as  being 
Competitive  (10%).  More  importantly,  we  find  that  individuals  with  different 
interdependent preferences indeed have different beliefs about others’ actions and that 
they are correlated with their type. Selfish individuals systematically state they believe 
other individuals only take selfish actions, while other preferences types are more aware 
of the existent heterogeneity in actions. Social Welfare maximizers are the individuals 
whose beliefs are closest to the actual heterogeneity in observed behaviour. Finally, 
social information affects types very differently. While Selfish subjects never change 
their type, showing great robustness to social information, almost half of the subjects 
classified as having other regarding preferences (SW, IA and CP) are more vulnerable 
to  social  information  and  thus,  change  their  type,  tending  to  behave  overall  more 
selfishly.
10  
Our  results  suggest  that  it  may  be  problematic  to  assume  that  heterogeneity  in 
preferences is common knowledge, as well as to assume that updating those beliefs 
through social information will not influence behaviour. These findings have important 
implications for modelling interdependent preferences, as well as for the application of 
interdependent preferences to both non strategic and strategic settings. Thus, this paper 
contributes to the discussion of whether purely interdependent preferences, which take 
into account only payoff differences, capture the essence of other regarding preferences 
or,  on  the  contrary,  extended  models,  which  include  others’  expected  and  actual 
behaviour, are required. Notice that we chose a modified dictator game setting, that is, 
the simplest non strategic setting in which other regarding preferences affect behaviour. 
                                                 
10 The robustness of Selfish individuals to social information is in agreement with the work by Cason and 
Mui (1998) in regular dictator games.   6 
In  such  a  setting  the  explanation  for  non selfish  preferences  relies  mostly  on 
interdependent preferences. In light of our results, other regarding preferences, even in a 
simple dictator setting, are a more complicated object than the reduced form modelled 
by purely interdependent preferences.   
Outside the laboratory, for example in charitable giving, our results would imply 
that  individuals  have  different  expectations  about  others’  contributions,  making 
predictions on final takings of a charity campaign possibly inaccurate. Furthermore, our 
findings  suggest  social  information  can  be  used  to  effectively  influence  charitable 
giving.  In  particular,  those  who  never  contribute,  Selfish  individuals,  will  not  be 
affected by knowing others do, consistent with Fey and Meier (2004)’s findings in the 
field. However, those who actually contribute will be sensitive to social information and 
therefore the provision of the right information can be a useful resource to increase 
charitable giving. In particular, according to our results, Social Welfare and Inequity 
Averse individuals, two preferences types that would contribute to charity, should never 
be provided with information on those who do not contribute but only on those who do 
contribute.  This  is  consistent  with  Croson  and  Shang  (2008),  who  found  that 
manipulating  the  information  on  how  much  others  have  contributed  is  possible  to 
increase charitable contributions in the field. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the experimental 
design and procedures. Section 3 shows the main descriptive statistics in the three parts 
of  the  experiment.  Section  4  describes  the  classification  of  subjects  into  four 
interdependent  preferences types  according  to  their  choices  in  the  first  part  of  the 
experiment.  Section  5  explains  the  belief type  identification  and  classification,  and 
studies correlation between the actions based and beliefs based classifications. Section 
6 shows the new classification of subjects according to their actions in part three of the 
experiment, once they have been exposed to social information. Section 7 concludes. 
Figures, tables and experimental instructions are included in the Appendix. 
 
2.  Experimental Design and Procedures  
      Three  experimental  sessions  were  conducted  in  the  Laboratori  d’Economia 
Experimental (LEEX) at Universitat Pompeu Fabra using z Tree experimental software 
(Fischbacher, (2007)) in February, 2008. A total of 120 subjects, 40 per session, were 
recruited using the ORSEE recruiting system (Greiner, (2004)), ensuring that subjects 
had not participated in similar experiments in our laboratory in the past. After arrival,   7 
subjects extracted a piece of paper from a bag which randomly determined whether they 
would stay in the lab or they would go to a different classroom. We will refer to the 60 
subjects in the lab as “Deciders”, and the 60 subjects in the classroom as “Receivers”.
11 
Further, the 20 Deciders in each session were divided into two groups of 10 subjects 
each, which will be relevant for parts two and three of the experiment. A sheet with 
general  and  identical  instructions  was  distributed  and  read  aloud  to  all  subjects. 
Instructions for each of the subject roles were also read aloud in each room before tasks 
were  performed.  Once  the  experiment  had  concluded,  subjects  filled  in  a  voluntary 
questionnaire while they waited to be paid.  
      Each  experimental  session  lasted  one  and  a  half  hours  (including  assignment  of 
subjects to rooms and payment). Throughout the experiment we ensured anonymity and 
effective  separation  between  Deciders  and  Receivers,  locating  them  physically  in 
different  rooms,  in  order  to  minimize  any  interpersonal  influences  which  could 
stimulate  other regarding  behavior.  Subjects  were  paid  individually  and  in  private, 
using a closed envelope and starting with Deciders first. After Deciders had left, we 
called Receivers one by one into the laboratory and paid them.  
     Deciders performed three tasks which determined the payoffs for both player roles. 
Receivers waited in a separate classroom filling in a voluntary questionnaire that had no 
influence on their payoffs.
12 Tasks were presented in three different parts. For all three 
parts,  Deciders  were  shown  the  same  sixteen  decision  tables  which  described  the 
allocation of experimental units among two subjects.
13 According to any interdependent 
preferences model the optimal choice of actions is the same when decision tables are 
shown sequentially than when they are shown all at once. The order in which tables 
were shown to subjects was changed randomly from one task to the other, aiming to 
control for possible order effects and keep subjects engaged.  
                                                 
11  Subjects  know  their  role  in  the  experimental  task  before  they  take  any  action  (role  certainty).  In 
previous sessions, data from which is not used in this paper, we used role uncertainty in order to save 
costs and extract more information. We found significantly different results. We report differences when 
using role certainty vs. role uncertainty in Iriberri and Rey Biel (2008b).   
12 Receivers were also read the Deciders’ instructions for Part 1 and Part 3 such that they would know 
how their own payoffs were determined. Receivers were explicitly told that their earnings would not 
depend  on  whether  they  answered  the  voluntary  questionnaire  or  not,  although  they  all  did.  The 
questionnaire asked them to perform the same tasks as Deciders did, clearly stating that their decisions 
were hypothetical. The questionnaire is available upon request. Data from these unpaid questionnaires are 
not used in the current paper although we analyzed it. One important difference with respect to the results 
reported in the current paper is that the level of noise is significantly higher when subjects are not paid 
than  when  they  are  paid.  Also,  when  decisions  do  not  have  payoff  implications  and  therefore  are 
hypothetical, Dictators show more generous behavior towards Receivers.    
13 An experimental unit was equal to 0.25 Euro.   8 
     We now proceed to describe the sixteen decision tables. Each table contained three 
options, which showed different allocations of experimental units between Deciders and 
Receivers, as illustrated in Figure 2. One of the options contained the highest number of 
experimental units for the Decider, and we will refer to such option as the selfish action. 
Another option was constructed such that the Decider would lose one experimental unit 
in order to increase the Receiver’s allocation by s>1 units. We will refer to this option 
as the surplus creating action. The third option was constructed such that the Decider 
would lose again one experimental unit but this time in order to decrease the Receiver’s 
allocation by s>1 units. We will refer to this option as the surplus destroying action. As 
shown in the tables in Figure 3, we fixed the cost of creating and destroying surplus to 
one and varied s, the number of units that were created and destroyed.
14 The sixteen 
tables, shown in Figure 3, differed on: i) the difference between the Decider’s and the 
Receiver’s  allocations  (|x-y|),  ii)  the  Decider’s  relative  position  with  respect  to  the 
Receiver, that is, whether the Decider was ahead (better off than) or behind (worse off 
than)  the  Receiver  (x>y  or  x<y)  and  whether  this  would  change  depending  on  the 
chosen action, i.e., if x>y whether x-1> or <y+s,
15 and iii) the number of created and 
destroyed experimental units, that is, on s, which varied between 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7.  
     Deciders’  tasks  were  as  follows.  In  Part  1,  they  had  to  choose  one  of  the  three 
options  in  each  of  the  sixteen  tables,  knowing  that  they  were  randomly  and 
anonymously matched with a different participant in each table and that their payoffs 
corresponded to that of “Decider” while the “Receiver’s” payoffs corresponded to a 
matched Receiver in another classroom.  
     In  Part  2,  we  elicited  Deciders’  beliefs  about  other  Deciders’  actions.  The  20 
Deciders  in  each  session  were  divided  into  two  groups  of  10  participants  each. 
Deciders’ task was to guess how many of the 10 participants in the other group of 
Deciders had chosen each of the three options in each of the sixteen tables.
16  
                                                 
14 We will refer to 1/s alternatively as the price of creating or destroying surplus. Labels for options 
obviously used neutral language and the order of the selfish, surplus creating and surplus destroying 
actions was randomly chosen for each of the sixteen tables.  
15 In six out of sixteen tables, tables 2, 3, 5, 7, 11 and 12, Deciders’ payoffs were higher than Receivers’ 
for all three available choices. In other six tables, tables 1, 6, 8, 10, 13 and 14, Deciders’ payoffs were 
lower than Receivers’ for all available choices. Finally, in four out of sixteen tables, Deciders’ relative 
position changed depending on the chosen action. In tables 9 and 15, Decider’s relative position changes 
from ahead to behind only when the surplus creating action is chosen. In tables 4 and 16 Decider’s 
relative position changes from behind to ahead only when the surplus destroying action is chosen. When 
referring to subjects’ relative position in a table, we generally refer to their position when taking the 
selfish action. 
16 We elicited beliefs by asking subjects about frequencies of play instead of probabilities (Costa Gomes 
and Weizsäcker (in press)), following Gigerenzer’s (2000, 2002) and Hoffrage et al. (2000)’s hypothesis 
that individuals may find frequencies more meaningful than the probability of a single event which occurs   9 
     Finally, in Part 3 Deciders had to choose again among the three options in each of 
the sixteen tables, although this time subjects were informed about the exact distribution 
of choices previously made by the 10 participants of the other group of Deciders in each 
of the sixteen tables in Part 1. Deciders were again matched randomly and anonymously 
to a Receiver in another classroom, who was different from the one in Part 1, in order to 
avoid possible compensations between amounts allocated in Part 1 and Part 3. 
     At  the  end  of  the  experiment  three  tables  were  randomly  chosen  to  determine 
payments  for  each  of  the  three  parts.
17  Deciders  received  the  sum  of  a  3  Euro 
participation fee, plus the allocation they had chosen for “Decider” in the randomly 
chosen tables in Parts 1 and 3, plus the amount earned according to a quadratic scoring 
rule rewarding accuracy of their elicited beliefs in the randomly chosen table in Part 2.
18 
Receivers earned the 3 Euro participation fee, plus the allocation for the “Receiver”, 
chosen by their randomly matched Decider in the randomly chosen tables in Parts 1 and 
3. Average total payments were 13.94 Euros for Deciders and 9.25 Euros for Receivers. 
 
3.  Descriptive Statistics 
     We start by exploring subjects’ average behaviour over all sixteen tables in the three 
parts  of  the  experiment.  Table  1  reports  the  number  of  times  each  of  the  available 
actions, selfish, surplus creating and surplus destroying actions, were chosen in Part 1 of 
the experiment. We separate those tables in which the Decider has a higher payoff than 
the Receiver (“Ahead”) from those in which Decider’s payoff is lower (“Behind”). The 
selfish action was chosen with highest frequency, not only on average (69%), but also in 
                                                                                                                                               
once. See the discussion in Rey Biel (in press). Additionally, eliciting probabilities creates the problem 
that the experimenter does not know the real probability distribution so it cannot reward for accuracy in 
probabilities.  
17 Tasks in Parts 1 and 3 are identical except for the extra information provided in Part 3. Subjects were 
therefore rewarded in an identical way for their decisions in these two parts. Also, we wanted to avoid 
any compensation effect between these two parts of the experiment. We chose to pick one game randomly 
in each part making sure that the Receiver in Part 3 was a different one of that from Part 1. Another 
alternative would have been rewarding for one decision table among all 28 decisions made in Parts 1 and 
3.  We  considered  it  was  simpler  to  communicate  to  subjects  that  they  would  be  rewarded  by  one 
randomly chosen decision table in each of the parts.     
18 The particular quadratic scoring rule (QSR) used in the experiment is shown in the Instructions. There 
exists  no  consensus  yet  among  experimentalists  about  the  optimal  incentive  mechanism  for  eliciting 
beliefs. Huck and Weizsäcker (2001) find that QSRs yield more precise belief statements than bidding 
functions.  However,  with  a  finite  population  of  subjects,  QSRs  have  the  problem  that  they  are  not 
necessarily  incentive  compatible,  although  expected  payoff  maximizers  can  do  no  better  by  stating 
different  beliefs  than  their  true  beliefs.  Other  problems  of  QSRs  are  that  incentives  are  flat  at  the 
maximum and that they may be difficult to understand. To avoid the latter problem, our instructions 
emphasized that understanding the particular QSR used was not essential and that it was important to 
understand that the more accurate their beliefs were the more they would be paid. Similarly, aiming for 
simplicity, Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) offered a fixed fee to subjects who correctly guessed the 
proportion of subjects choosing a single option within a five percent interval. For a discussion on QSRs 
see Offerman and Sonnemans (2001) and Andersen et al. (2007).   10 
each of the sixteen tables. The selfish action was chosen slightly less frequently when 
Deciders were ahead (66%) than when they were behind (72%). The surplus creating 
action was chosen with second highest frequency overall (23%), although it was more 
frequently chosen when the Decider was ahead (30%) than when behind (17%). Finally, 
the surplus destroying action was the least chosen (8%).
19 Deciders chose to destroy 
surplus more frequently when behind (11%) than when ahead (5%). Although average 
behavior  did  not  change  much  across  tables,  standard  deviations  indicate  that  there 
exists variability across subjects.
20 As we will show in the next section, we can explain 
this variability with the existence of different preferences types. 
     Table  2  reports  the  average  frequency  subjects  assigned  to  each  of  the  actions, 
selfish, surplus creating and surplus destroying actions, taken by the other group of 
Deciders. We observe that subjects expected the selfish action to be chosen on average 
with highest frequency (75%), which as we have seen, was correct. Furthermore, on 
average subjects consistently believed that the selfish action was chosen with highest 
frequency  in  all  sixteen  tables,  no  matter  the  Decider’s  relative  position.  Surplus 
creating  and  destroying  actions  were  expected  to  be  chosen  with  lower  frequencies 
(14% and 12% respectively). The surplus creating action was believed to be chosen with 
slightly higher frequency when Deciders were ahead (16%) than behind (12%). Finally, 
the surplus destroying action was expected to be chosen slightly more frequently when 
Deciders were behind (13%) than ahead (11%). Standard deviations also indicate that 
there exists heterogeneity in beliefs. In Section 5 we will study the sources of such 
heterogeneity.  
     Finally,  Table  3  reports  the  frequency  with  which  each  of  the  available  actions, 
selfish, surplus creating and destroying actions, were chosen in the third part of the 
experiment. We again observe the familiar pattern that the selfish action was chosen 
with highest frequency (71% when ahead and 78% when behind). The surplus creating 
action was more frequently chosen when ahead (24%) than when behind (14%). Finally, 
the  surplus  destroying  action  was  chosen  with  lowest  frequency,  although  more 
frequently  when  Deciders  were  behind  (8%)  than  ahead  (5%).  Comparing  average 
frequency of play in Tables 1 and 3, we can see the selfish action has become more 
                                                 
19 The surplus creating action was also the action chosen with second highest frequency in all tables but 
tables 8 and 10, in which the percentages with which surplus creating and destroying actions were chosen 
were very similar. 
20 We performed Fisher Exact probability tests to check whether differences in the observed proportions 
of the three actions between each pair of tables could have been expected by chance. Under the two tailed 
null hypothesis of equal probability between observed proportions and at the 5% significance level, we 
find that out of 120 comparisons ([(16*16) 16]/2), only 28 (23.3%) are significantly different.   11 
prominent and surplus creating and surplus destroying action less frequent in Part 3. 
Standard deviations also indicate that there exists heterogeneity in chosen actions. 
     Our analysis in the following sections will study the sources of heterogeneity behind 
the average behavior reported here.  
 
4.  Results  in  Part  1  of  the  Experiment:  Estimation  of  the  Distribution  of 
Interdependent Preferences-types 
     This  section  describes  the  identification  strategy  of  different  interdependent 
preferences types in the first part of the experiment and presents the estimated type 
distribution for different econometric specifications.  
     Our  econometric  specifications  follow  the  mixture of types  models  of  Stahl  and 
Wilson  (1994,  1995),  Harless  and  Camerer  (1994),  El Gamal  and  Grether  (1995), 
Costa Gomes, Crawford, and Broseta (2001), Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2004), Costa 
Gomes and Crawford (2006) and Crawford and Iriberri (2007a, 2007b).
21 As explained 
in the introduction, we consider four different interdependent preferences types; Selfish 
(SF), Social Welfare maximizers (SW), Inequity Averse (IA) and Competitive (CP). 
Readers who are familiar with the application of mixture of type models can skip ahead 
to results on page 14. 
     The identification strategy for the preferences types classification is based on CR’s 
piece wise linear preferences utility function, shown in equation (1). Deciders’ utility 
(uD) depends on both Decider’s own payoff ( D p ) and Receiver’s payoff ( R p ). The two 
key parameters are the weight on the Receiver’s payoff, r, when the Decider is ahead 
the Receiver ( R D p p > ), and the weight, s, when the Decider is behind the Receiver 
( D R p p >  ).  
(1)  D R D R D s r s r u p s r p s r p p ) 1 ( ) ( ) , ( - - + + = , 
where r = 1 if  R D p p >  and r = 0 otherwise, and s = 1 if  R D p p <  and s = 0 otherwise. 
     Each Decider i at decision table t, has three available actions, a={S,C,D}, referring to 
selfish (“S”), surplus creating (“C”) and surplus destroying (“D”) actions respectively. 
According to CR’s utility function, Deciders would choose among the available actions 
after  evaluating  them  into  the  utility  function  given  in  (1).  Remember  that  SF  type 
should always choose the Decider’s payoff maximizing action. SW type should either 
choose  the  surplus  creating  action  or  the  selfish  action,  regardless  of  the  Decider’s 
                                                 
21 Our main application, individual by individual estimation and uniform errors, is closest to El Gamal 
and Grether (1995) and Costa Gomes, Crawford and Broseta (2001).   12 
relative position. IA type should either choose the surplus creating action or the selfish 
action when Deciders are ahead, while they should choose either the selfish action or 
the surplus destroying action when behind. Finally, CP should either choose the surplus 
destroying action or the selfish action, regardless of their relative position. For all types 
except Selfish, the choice between the surplus creating (destroying) action and selfish 
action will depend on the price of creating (destroying) action, given by (1/s), where s is 
the number of created (destroyed) units in the decision tables (see footnote 27). 
     The utility of a given Decider at decision table t and when taking action a, is thus 
given by the next equation (2): 
(2)  Dta Rta Dta Rta D s r s r u p s r p s r p p ) 1 ( ) ( ) , ( - - + + =  for  T t ,..., 1 = and  } , , { D C S a = . 
     Based on CR’s piece wise linear utility function, a preference type k will be defined 
by the sign the parameters r and s may take. For SF type, both parameters must be 
zero, so they are fixed and will not be estimated. For SW type, both parameters must be 
strictly positive. For IA, r must be strictly positive and s non positive. Finally, for CP, 
both parameters must be non positive and at least one parameter strictly negative.
22 A 
pair ( k k s r , ) defines a preferences type and we will refer to the utility of the Decider 
who belongs to preferences type k as  ). (× Dk u  
     Given a specific preferences type, individuals evaluate the three available actions 
and choose the action that yields the highest utility. We also introduce a uniform iid 
error across different decision tables, meaning that, with some probability, given by e, 
to  be  estimated,  individuals  make  a  mistake  and  choose  any  of  the  available  three 
actions with equal probability. Hence, according to CR’s utility function and the iid 
error, the predicted choice at decision table t for a Decider who belongs to preferences 
type k, is shown in equation (3).  
(3)  
3
1 ) 1 ( ) , , ( Pr )) , ( arg(max
e
e e s r p p + - = = Dta Rta Dk au a Dkt k k a ice edictedCho   for  } , , { D C S a = ,  
} , , , { CP IA SW S k =  and  T t ,..., 1 = .  
The indicator function  a 1  takes value 1, if action a yields the highest utility, and zero 
otherwise.  With  no  error,  e=0,  the  action  yielding  highest  utility  is  chosen  with 
                                                 
22 We considered individuals with strictly positive ρ and σ equal to zero as Inequity Averse since their 
behavior would always yield a more equalitarian distribution of payoffs. These subjects take surplus 
creating actions when ahead and behave as purely selfish when behind. Most of the subjects classified as 
IA are found to have these estimated parameter values (See Tables 4 and 10). Subjects with strictly 
negative ρ or/and σ were classified as Competitive since this would mean that they either choose the 
selfish action or incur in a cost to destroy Receiver’s surplus.   13 
probability one. With positive error, 1>e>0, the action yielding the highest utility is 
chosen with higher probability than other actions although it is chosen with probability 
smaller than one. Finally, if e=1 the individual is purely random and chooses any of the 
available actions with equal probability.  
     Notice that CR’s utility function is restrictive in its specific linear form. Therefore, 
the error term is capturing two types of errors. One type of error is taking both surplus 
creating and surplus destroying actions in tables in which the subject’s relative position 
is kept constant. No preferences type k  can  explain this type of error, which is not 
implied  by  the  linearity  restriction  but  by  the  basic  consistency  restriction  that 
indifference curves should not cross. The other type of error is creating or destroying 
surplus for a certain price but not doing so for a lower price. This partly comes from the 
linearity restriction. Using a more flexible utility function, such as Constant Elasticity of 
Substitution, could accommodate some of this second type of errors. However, when we 
considered this case, only 5 out of 60 individuals improved in their log likelihood, so we 
will stick to CR’s linear utility function for simplicity.
23  
     The decision data collected in Part 1 of the experiment consisted of T decisions over 
S, C and D actions for each of the N Deciders, called in general Choice. The typical 
observation, called Dit a Choice ) ( , takes value 1 if individual i took action a at decision 
table t, and 0 otherwise. Having described the  predicted choice in equation (3) and 
Decider’s  actions  data,  we  can  now  construct  the  likelihood  function  for  the  three 
different econometric specifications that we have considered.  
     The first one is an individual by individual estimation, which yields a set of 
estimated parameters (r, s, e) for each individual i. Accordingly,  i p  is estimated to be 
equal to one for the preferences type which explains best Decider i and zero for other 
types. The overall preferences type distribution is obtained counting the number of 
subjects classified in each type. The likelihood function to be maximized is shown in 
expression (4).  




t D C S a
a Choice
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CP IA SW S k
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Dit a ice edictedCho p Choice L
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23 A constant elasticity of substitution utility function includes an extra parameter that determines the 
curvature of the indifference curve, allowing for linear but also Cobb Douglas or Leontief functional 
forms. As mentioned, only 5 out of 60 individuals were better explained by this more flexible functional 
form. Also and more importantly, since we are not interested in the point estimation of r and s but in a 
categorization of individuals into different interdependent preferences types based only on the sign of 
these parameter values, we report results using the CR linear utility function.   14 
     The other two specifications refer to population level estimations. Here, we consider 
two different specifications. Both estimate r and s for each preferences type k, as well 
as k p , the frequency for each type k. The difference between the two specifications is 
that while the former estimates a type specific error term the latter estimates one unique 
error term for all types. The type specific error and the one error likelihood functions 
are given by equations (5) and (6) respectively.
24 
(5)
Õ Õ Õ ∑
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     The estimation results are summarized in Tables 4 to 6.  
     We  will  start  with  the  most  flexible  specification,  the  individual  by  individual 
estimation, which estimates a set of parameters (r, s, e) for each Decider i. 37% of the 
subjects, 22 out of 60, are estimated without any error and their preferences types are 
readable directly from their actions, which are summarized in the first 6 columns of 
Table 4. They show the number of decision tables in which each Decider takes the 
selfish, surplus creating and surplus destroying actions, separating for Deciders’ relative 
position. There is at least one subject which can be classified into each preferences type 
without error. Subject 4, among many others, is classified as SF because consistently 
chose the selfish action in all decision tables. Subject 37 is classified as SW because she 
consistently  chose  the  surplus  creating  action  in  all  decision  tables.  We  classified 
subject 52 as IA because she chose the surplus creating action once when ahead but 
never when behind.
25 Finally, subject 44 is classified as CP since she consistently chose 
the surplus destroying action in all decision tables. Furthermore, almost 87% of the 
subjects, 52 out of 60, are estimated as having a particular preferences type with an 
error level equal to or less than 0.38.
26 Apart from the error level, Table 4 also suggests 
                                                 
24 Notice that the predicted choice will have subscript i only when we allow for an individual specific 
error term and an individual specific r and s, that is, in the first specification. In the population level 
estimations the predicted choice will be the same for two subjects who belong to the same type k.  
25 Notice that none of the subjects who took mostly surplus creating actions when ahead and surplus 
destroying  actions  when  behind  was  classified  without  error.  Subjects  17,  26  and  40  exhibited  this 
behavior but were classified as IA with an error level of 28% (e=0.28).  
26 The 8 individuals estimated with a higher error level (ε>0.38) require such error to be classified into 
one of the four categories. Some of these subjects are just noisy, such as subjects 12, 13, 18, 32, 57 and 
59. But subjects 54 and 60 are furthermore more difficult to classify. For example, subject 54 is estimated 
to  have  a  ρ  equal  to  zero  and  a  strictly  positive  σ,  which  can  not  be  accommodated  by  any  of  the 
interdependent preferences types assumed by the CR model. Subject 60, given the high error rate, is   15 
that  there  is  considerable  individual  variation  in  the  parameter  values  ρ  and  σ.  For 
example, among those individuals classified as SW, there are some, such as subject 37, 
who always choose the surplus creating action, regardless of the price of such action, 
which yields the highest possible value of 0.34 for ρ and σ. However, there are also 
other subjects, such as subject 49, who require a lower price for creating surplus when 
they are ahead than when behind, which yields a higher ρ than σ (ρ=0.34, σ=0.26). 
Also, among those individuals who are estimated to be IA, some Deciders, such as 
subject 29, never chose to destroy surplus when behind, which yields an estimate of σ 
equal to zero, but others, such as subject 17, choose to actively destroy surplus when 
behind, which yields a negative estimate of σ (ρ=0.34, σ=  0.51).
27  
     Based  on  the  individual  by  individual  estimation,  Table  5  reports  the  average 
frequency of play of the three available actions, a={S, C, D}, separately for subjects 
classified in each of the preferences types. This table clearly shows the idea behind our 
identification strategy for different preferences types. Subjects classified as SF almost 
always chose the selfish action (98% of the time). Subjects classified as SW chose the 
surplus  creating  action  with  highest  frequency  (60%  of  the  time)  and  very  rarely 
decided to destroy surplus (2% of the time). Subjects classified as IA chose the Selfish 
action with highest frequency, but also took the surplus creating and destroying actions 
with non trivial frequency (27% and 9% of the time respectively). As expected, subjects 
classified as IA created surplus much more when ahead (50%) than when behind (6%) 
and they destroyed surplus more when behind (15%) than when ahead (4%). Subjects 
                                                                                                                                               
estimated to have a σ equal to zero but allows for a value of ρ which can be positive or zero, which makes 
its  classification  difficult,  since  both  Selfish  and  Inequity  Averse  preferences  can  be  behind  those 
parameter values. 





. Thus, if a Decider chooses to create at s, both when she is ahead and behind, then r and s 




. Since s takes values of 2,3,4,5, 6 and 7 then r and s 
can be estimated to take values strictly higher than 0.33, 0.25, 0.20, 0.16, 0.1428 and 0.125 respectively. 
In those cases, for simplicity we will write estimates of 0.34, 0.26, 0.21, 0.17, 0.15 and 0.13 in a way that 
for example an estimate equal to 0.21 means that when s≥4 Decider chooses to create surplus but when  
s<4 the Decider chooses the selfish action. Notice that the highest r and s we can identify is therefore 
0.34, which is slightly lower than it has been found in the literature. In a similar way, the decision of 





Decider chooses to destroy at s, both when she is ahead and behind, then r and s will be estimated 




. Since s takes values of 1,2,3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 the negative r can be estimated to 
take values strictly lower than  1,  0.5,  0.33,  0.25, 0.20,  0.16. In those cases, we will write  1.1,  0.51,  
0.34,  0.26,  0.21,  0.17 in a way that for example an estimate equal to  0.26 means that when s≥5  the 
Decider chooses to destroy surplus but when s<5  then she will favour the selfish action.   16 
classified as CP were, as expected, the ones taking the surplus destroying action with 
highest frequency (44% of the time). 
     Results in Tables 4 and 5 suggest that the identification strategy was successful in 
classifying individuals into different preferences types. Notice that had a subject chosen 
her actions randomly, the estimated error term in the individual by individual estimation 
would have been equal to one (e=1). Given that the preferences type classification is 
going to be crucial for the analysis of the second and third parts of the experiment, we 
decided to continue the analysis only with those subjects whose type is estimated within 
the  reasonable  noise  level  mentioned  above  (e£0.38).  For  the  population  level 
estimation, as well as for the second and third parts, we thus limit our sample of 60 to 
52 subjects.
28  
     Table  6  summarizes  the  preferences type  distribution  for  each  of  the  three 
specifications.  The  first  four  columns  refer  to  the  summary  of  the  individual  by 
individual estimation discussed above, where ρ, σ and ε are averaged across individuals 
classified as belonging to each preferences type. The second block shows the population 
level estimation where the error level is allowed to depend on the preferences type. 
Finally, the third block shows the most aggregated population level estimation, in which 
the error term is restricted to be equal for all types. The three different specifications, 
from left to right, are ordered from the least to the most restrictive in terms of allowed 
flexibility and the number of parameters. From the individual by individual estimation 
we can see that SF individuals are the least noisy, followed by the rest of the types. This 
suggests that the one error specification is quite restrictive, as it distorts the most the 
preferences type distribution. Overall, the estimated type distribution is fairly  robust 
across the three specifications. SF is the most frequent type and its frequency varies 
between the 44% and 63% of the distribution, depending on the level of aggregation in 
the estimation. It is followed by SW and IA types, whose frequencies vary from 21% to 
9% and from 32% to 22% respectively. The least frequent type is CP, whose frequency 
varies between 10% and 6%. This preferences type distribution is fairly similar to the 
ones previously found in the literature by Andreoni and Miller (2002) and Fisman et al 
(2007).
29  
                                                 
28 Our analysis with the complete sample offers the same qualitative results. This analysis is available 
upon request. 
29 Andreoni and Miller’s (2002) design cannot distinguish between Selfish and Competitive preferences. 
They find the following distribution for Selfish, Social Welfare and Inequity Averse respectively, 44%, 
21%, and 35%. Fisman et al.’s (2007) design can further identify what they call Lexicographic Self while 
we cannot, so if we add up their Lexicographic Self and Selfish frequencies, their type distribution for   17 
     For  the  rest  of  the  analysis,  we  will  use  the  individual  by  individual  type 
classification of the sub sample of 52 subjects. Under such classification, 44% of the 
subjects are classified as being Selfish (SF), 21% as Social Welfare maximizers (SW), 
25% as Inequity Averse (IA) and finally 10% as Competitive (CP).  
 
5.  Results  in  Part  2  of  the  Experiment:  Belief-type  Identification  and 
Correlation Between the Interdependent Preferences-types and Belief-types 
     This  section  describes  the  belief type  identification  strategy  and  presents  the 
estimated  belief types  with  different  econometric  specifications.  We  also  look  for 
correlations  between  the  identified  belief types  and  the  interdependent  preferences 
types already estimated in the previous section.  
     We  will  start  commenting  on  overall  belief  accuracy.  We  calculate  the  average 
square  error  (ASE)  between  subjects’  beliefs  and  the  real  distribution  of  actions, 
averaging across all subjects. The ASE over all sixteen tables was 20.07, i.e., around a 
10% of the maximum error subjects could have made.
30 Although this ASE seems to 
indicate  that  subjects  were  reasonably  accurate,  averaging  across  subjects  gives  a 
misleading idea of the knowledge subjects had about the heterogeneity in actions. As it 
will become clear later, there exist significant differences in beliefs across subjects. 
     Our objective is to identify the belief types present in the subject population and 
measure the level of heterogeneity in their beliefs. After we have identified them, we 
will be able to classify each subject into different classes of beliefs in order to relate the 
two classifications, one based on their actions and thus on preferences and the other 
based on their beliefs. 
     One  simple  way  to  identify  beliefs  and  look  for  differences  among  different 
preferences types  consists  of  averaging  elicited  beliefs  across  individuals  who  were 
classified  into  the  same  preferences type  according  to  their  choice  in  Part  1  of  the 
experiment. Table 7 shows the average frequency of play expected by those subjects 
classified as belonging to each of the preferences types. All types of subjects assign 
highest frequency to others choosing the selfish action, which as Table 1 showed, is 
right.  However,  Table  7  also  suggests  that  different  preferences types  may  have 
                                                                                                                                               
Selfish, Social Welfare, Inequity Averse and Competitive is 62%, 13%, 19%, and 5%, respectively. Both 
distributions are quite similar to ours. 
30 The minimum possible ASE is obviously 0, while the maximum possible ASE is 200, corresponding 
for example to stating beliefs (10, 0, 0) while the frequency of actions taken were (0, 10, 0). Looking at 
the average square error in each of the sixteen tables we do not observe clear differences. Subjects on 
average  were  most  accurate  in  table  3  (ASE=13.47)  while  they  were  most  imprecise  in  table  11 
(ASE=31.11).   18 
different  beliefs.  In  particular,  SF  subjects  assign  much  higher  frequency  (92%)  to 
others subjects taking the selfish action than other types (61%, 71% and 66% for SW, 
IA  and  CP  types,  respectively).  Additionally,  SW  subjects  are  the  ones  assigning 
highest frequency (28%) to the surplus creating action, while CP subjects are the ones 
assigning highest frequency  (25%) to the surplus destroying  action. This result also 
points on the direction of the existence of “false consensus bias”. This is a regularity 
found in the psychological literature as well as in Economics, which describes the fact 
that individuals tend to believe others are more likely to be like themselves, i.e. in our 
experiment, they would assign high frequency to other subjects taking the same actions 
as they themselves took.
31 
     However, averaging beliefs of those individuals classified into a preferences type 
can be misleading since it imposes the assumption that all individuals belonging to a 
type according to their actions should have similar beliefs. Since this is in fact one of 
the questions we are interested in addressing, we opted for a different strategy. We take 
a  purely  empirical  strategy  in  identifying  experimental  subjects’  beliefs  about  the 
actions  of  other  individuals.  Furthermore,  we  empirically  test  whether  individuals 
classified  as  belonging  to  different  preferences types  actually  have  different  beliefs 
about others’ actions.  
     We follow a mixture of types model, using the elicited belief data, to identify belief 
types, as well as the frequencies associated with each of the belief types. The elicited 
belief data consists of a probability distribution over the three available actions, a={S, 
C, D}, for each of the T decision tables and each of the N individuals. The typical 
elicited belief observation is given by ( it Seb , it Ceb ), where  it Seb and  it Ceb   represent the 
frequencies Decider i associates to observing the selfish and surplus creating actions at 
decision table t. Notice that the belief about the surplus destroying action is given by 
one minus the beliefs about selfish and surplus creating actions. For example, if Decider 
i states that half of the ten participants in the other group of Deciders chose the selfish 
                                                 
31 False consensus bias was first mentioned by psychologists (Ross (1977) and Mullen et al. (1985)). 
Economists have also found evidence of it, see Selten and Ockenfels (1993) and Charness and Grosskpof 
(2001). Engelmann and Strobel (2000) define real false consensus effect as weighting own decisions 
more heavily than those of a randomly selected person from the same population. We look at the average 
frequency subjects classified under each type assign to the action they take in each of the tables. This is 
not strictly a measure of the self consensus bias since it is affected by the frequency with which actions 
are actually taken. In any case, SF subjects assign highest frequency (0.91) to others taking their own 
action. SW subjects assign a frequency of 0.45 to their own action being taken, while IA subjects assign a 
frequency of 0.59 to their own action. Finally, CP subjects assign a frequency of 0.64 to their own action.    19 
action and the other half the surplus creating action, then the elicited belief observation 
will take the values (0.5, 0.5).
32 
     When applying a mixture of types model to the analysis of beliefs we have to make 
some  specification  decisions.  First,  we  need  to  address  what  the  specification  of  a 
belief type  is.  We  consider  two  different  belief type  specifications,  depending  on 
whether the relative position of a subject matters (or not) for belief statements. Our 
unrestricted specification defines a belief type as two different probability distributions 
over selfish, surplus creating and surplus destroying actions; one when the Decider is 
better off  than  the  Receiver  and  another  when  the  Decider  is  worse off.  This 
specification thus separates the elicited beliefs about others’ actions into two different 
sets depending on the Decider’s relative position (rp), rp={A,B}, which we name A and 
B referring to ahead  and behind respectively. The typical belief type k will then be 
given by ( k k k k CbB SbB CbA SbA , , , ). The restricted specification defines a belief type as 
a  distribution  over  selfish,  surplus  creating  and  surplus  destroying  actions,  without 
differentiating for the Decider’s relative position. The typical belief type is then given 
by ( k k Cb Sb , ). The decision about whether the data fits one specification better than the 
other will be taken using a likelihood ratio test.  
     The  second  question  we  need  to  address  is  how  many  belief types  we  should 
consider. We took a conservative position and started allowing for only one belief type, 
which yields exactly the average beliefs in the subject population. We then added types 
one by one until the explanatory power of adding one more type was offset by the 
increased number of parameters to be estimated. For the decision over the number of 
belief types, we again used likelihood ratio tests. The  restricted model  refers to the 
specification with (k-1) belief types and the unrestricted model the specification with (k) 
belief types.  
     The likelihood functions for the k different belief types in the specification where the 
Decider’s relative position matters, are shown in equation (7). A belief type is given by 
) , , , ( k k k k CbB SbB CbA SbA   and  k p   refers  to  the  frequency  of  the  kth  belief type. 
Observations  are  counted  separately  when  the  Decider  is  ahead  and  behind  the 
Receiver.  That  is,  the  sixteen  decision  tables  will  be  divided  into  two  sets  of  eight 
depending on the Decider’s relative position represented by rp.  
                                                 
32 Remember that beliefs were elicited as frequencies. The task involved distributing 10 subjects into 
three different actions (S, C and D), rather than assigning probabilities of observing each of the available 
actions. The elicited belief data was divided by 10 to obtain the probability distribution over the three 
actions so that the elicited belief about the surplus destroying action is given by ( it it Ceb Seb - - 1 ).   20 
(7)
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     The likelihood function for the k different belief types in the restricted belief type 
specification,  where  the  Decider’s  relative  position  does  not  matter,  is  shown  in 
equation (8). Now, the belief type is given by  ) , ( k k Cb Sb  and, as before,  k p  refers to 
the  frequency  of  the  kth  belief type.  Also,  the  actual  elicited  beliefs  are  given  by 
( it Seb , it Ceb ) but now the observations will not be separated for when the Decider is 
ahead or behind the Receiver.  
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     The estimated belief types are summarized in Table 8. The first block of columns, 
models  (1)  to  (4),  shows  the  simpler  belief type  specification  when  the  Decider’s 
relative position does not matter while the second block of columns, models (5) to (8), 
shows the belief type specification when the Decider’s relative position matters. The 
difference  between  models  (1),  (2),  (3)  and  (4),  as  well  as  the  difference  between 
models (5), (6), (7) and (8), is the number of allowed belief types, which changes from 
one to up to four belief types. Therefore, horizontally we can compare the two different 
specifications of belief types keeping the number of types fixed, while vertically we can 
compare  what  we  gain  when  we  allow  for  heterogeneity  within  each  belief type 
specification.  Likelihood  ratio  tests  are  our  guide  to  decide  over  the  two  different 
specifications, as well as over the number of types. As it becomes clear in Table 8, 
likelihood ratio tests persistently favor the belief type specification where the Decider’s 
relative position is not taken into account. When models (1) and (5), (2) and (6), (3) and 
(7), and finally (4) and (8) are compared, the likelihood ratio tests cannot reject the 
restricted model, the simpler belief type specification, with p values of 0.19, 0.37, 0.57 
and 0.67 respectively. Also, when deciding about how much heterogeneity to allow for, 
i.e., about the number of belief types to consider, likelihood ratio tests favor including 
up to three different belief types but not the fourth one.
33 That is, the likelihood ratio 
test favors model (3), which will be our focus (in bold in Table 8).  
     According to model (3), the most frequent belief type in the subject population, held 
by 55% of the subjects, represents an almost mass point distribution concentrated on the 
                                                 
33  When  models  (2)  and  (3)  are  compared,  the  unrestricted  model  is  favored  (p value  0.0000028), 
suggesting it is worth considering a third type, but when models (3) and (4) are compared, the restricted 
model is favored (p value 0.12), suggesting it is not worth allowing for a fourth belief type.   21 
selfish action. These Deciders believe that the vast majority of other Deciders, 93% of 
them, will choose the selfish action. A second belief type, held by 20% of the subjects, 
assigns highest frequency to the selfish action (64%) but also assigns a high weight to 
the surplus creating action (32%), while it does not assign hardly any weight to the 
surplus destroying action (4%). Finally, a third belief type, held by 25% of the subjects, 
distributes the probabilities more evenly among the three actions. Most of the weight is 
again  on  the  selfish  action  (54%),  but  subjects  holding  these  beliefs  assign  high 
frequency to others taking the surplus destroying action (31%) and the surplus creating 
action (14%). 
     These three belief types represent different views about what others do. Given the 
actual  frequencies  of  actions  observed  in  Part  1  of  the  experiment  (72%  of  selfish 
actions,  24%  surplus  creating  and  8%  surplus  destroying),  subjects  believing  most 
actions would be selfish and surplus creating (but almost no surplus destroying) were 
most accurate. That is, the second belief type is the most accurate one.
34  
     Once we have selected model (3), where there are three belief types, we can classify 
each individual into different identified belief types. This can be done with a likelihood 
function  or  even  following  a  mean  square  error  criterion  so  that  each  individual  is 
classified into the belief type from which her elicited beliefs deviate the least. Both 
methods  give  us  the  same  classification.  We  can  therefore  proceed  with  a  direct 
comparison  between  the  classification  of  subjects  by  their  actions  (preferences type 
classification in Part 1) and the classification of subjects by their beliefs.  
     Results are shown in Table 9. This contingency table shows the preferences type 
classification by rows and the beliefs type classification by columns. Each cell of the 
table contains the number of individuals classified as belonging to the preferences type 
represented  by  that  particular  row,  who  have  the  belief type  represented  by  that 
particular  column.  We  observe  dependency  between  the  row  and  column 
classifications.
35 Subjects classified as SF are clearly behind the first belief type. As 
                                                 
34 Calculating the ASE for each of the three beliefs types, we find that subjects holding the Belief Type 1 
incurred in a 56.41% ASE of the maximum they could have made. Belief Type 2 subjects made an ASE 
of 13.35% of the maximum while Belief Type 3 subjects made an ASE of 49.50% of the maximum. 
Notice  that  ASE s  here  are  calculated  slightly  differently  than  the  average  ASE  calculated  at  the 
beginning of this section. The reason is that we are here imposing that individuals classified under a 
particular belief type, hold the same beliefs in all sixteen tables.  
35 Association measure tests such as Goodman and Kruskal’s Tau and Uncertainty Coefficients both yield 
(asymptotic)  p values  lower  than  0.001.  A  Chi square  test  allows  us  to  conclude  that  rows  are  not 
independent (p value=0.002). Pair wise Fisher Exact tests inform us that the distribution of beliefs types 
of subjects classified as SF and SW and of subjects classified as SF and IA are significantly different (p 
values  of  0.001  and  0.019  respectively).  Other  pair wise  comparisons  are  not  significantly  different 
partially due to the sample size.    22 
such, SF subjects can hardly conceive any other action but the selfish one. Other types 
of  subjects  have  more  disperse  beliefs.  Most  subjects  classified  as  SW,  six  out  of 
eleven, are behind the second belief type. They believe the selfish action is chosen with 
highest frequency (64%) but assign high frequency (32%) to the surplus creating action, 
and almost none (4%) to the surplus destroying action. Subjects classified as CP either 
have the third type of beliefs, i.e., they conceive the selfish  and surplus destroying 
actions  are  taken  with  highest  probability  or  they  have  the  first  belief  type,  only 
conceiving  the  selfish  action  as  being  taken  by  other  Deciders.  Finally,  subjects 
classified as IA hold all three belief types. 
     Overall, Table 9 can be summarized as showing that while everyone believes the 
selfish  action  is  taken  with  highest  frequency,  SF  and  CP  types  can  hardly  believe 
others may take the surplus creating action. Furthermore, SW and IA types believe a 
significant part of other Deciders create surplus, as themselves do, but they can still 
conceive selfish and surplus destroying actions being chosen by others.   
     We conclude that individuals do not have a homogeneous and accurate perception of 
the existent heterogeneity in actions and therefore in preferences. Furthermore, given 
the dependence found between preferences type and belief type classifications, different 
preferences types hold different beliefs about the heterogeneity in actions. While all 
subjects  are  affected  by  self consensus  bias,  Selfish  subjects  cannot  conceive  any 
heterogeneity  in  actions.  Other  preferences types  are  partially  affected  by  false 
consensus bias but believe others may take different actions than the ones they take. The 
preferences type that has the most accurate beliefs about others’ actions is the SW type. 
 
6.  Results  in  Part  3  of  the  Experiment:  Estimation  of  the  Distribution  of 
Interdependent  Preferences-types  after  Elicitation  of  Beliefs  and 
Observation of other Participants’ Actions 
    In  Part  3  of  the  experiment,  subjects  make  their  choices  over  the  three  available 
actions in the sixteen decision tables again, after having had their beliefs elicited and 
after having observed what the ten participants of the other group of Deciders in their 
same session actually chose in Part 1 of the experiment. We aim to compare how the 
elicited beliefs and the observation of others’ actions influence subjects’ actions and 
preferences types. We also look at how many subjects actually change preferences type 
from Part 1 to Part 3, toward which preferences type switches occurred and finally, how 
the observed information influences the changes.   23 
     The social influence literature suggests that people rely on social information to infer 
what the appropriate behaviour is in ambiguous situations, and then conform to the 
norm (Akerlof (1982), Jones (1984) and Bernheim (1994)). Cason and Mui (1998) also 
study the effect of social information on behaviour using a regular dictator game design. 
They test the “social influence hypothesis”, where an individual’s perception of what 
constitutes socially appropriate behaviour may depend on her estimate of others’ beliefs 
regarding  what  constitutes  socially  appropriate  behaviour.
36  We  aim  to  extend  the 
analysis of the effect of social information to our modified dictator game setting, where 
we show that such effect does not affect equally to the four interdependent preferences 
types previously identified. 
       We start by re classifying subjects according to their actions in the third part of the 
experiment. We re do the interdependent preferences type estimation, as explained in 
Section  4,  for  the  third  part  of  the  experiment  and  we  present  the  estimated  type 
distribution for different econometric specifications. Table 10 presents the individual by 
individual estimation and Table 12 summarizes the two population level estimations. 
The first thing to notice in Tables 10 and 12, compared to the estimation in Part 1 
shown in Tables 4 and 6, is that the noise level decreases considerably. In Part 3, 58% 
of subjects, 35 out of 60, are estimated to belong to a preferences type without any error 
in contrast to the 37% of subjects in Part 1. These noiseless subjects’ preferences types 
are readable directly from their actions, which are summarized in the first 6 columns of 
Table 10. The second important thing to notice is that the preferences type distribution 
changes  slightly  towards  a  distribution  where  the  SF  preferences type  is  even  more 
prominent.  Notice  that  most  of  the  reduction  in  noise  is  coming  from  the  higher 
frequency of SF types, who are on average the least noisy.
37 
                                                 
36 Notice that although their explanation seems to include second order beliefs, in practical terms their 
design only elicits first order beliefs. 
37 Although in Table 10 we show the individual by individual estimation for the 60 subjects, as stated in 
Section 4, for Tables 11 15, we will concentrate on the sub sample of 52 subjects estimated within a 
reasonable  error  level  of  0.38  in  Part  1  (see  footnote  24).  Among  those  52  subjects  there  are  some 
subjects estimated with an error level lower or equal to 0.38 in Part 1 but higher than 0.38 in Part 3 of the 
experiment. These are subjects 2, 20, 50 and 51. Moreover, two other subjects out of the 52 do not have a 
clear interdependent preferences type specification according to their actions in Part 3 so we will have to 
take a subjective decision about their types. Subject 15, with a noise level of 0.38 is estimated to have a ρ 
parameter between 0 and 0.34 and σ equal to  0.26. This subject allows for both IA and CP preferences. 
We classify this subject as CP, as we did according to his actions in Part 1. In a similar way, subject 50 
with an error level of 0.47 is estimated in Part 3 as having a ρ equal to 0 and a σ in the interval between 0 
and 0.13, which are not allowed by any type included in the CR model. We classify this subject as SF and 
consider the few times she creates surplus as an error. Finally, subject 59 also allows for a range of values 
in σ so she could be classified as either SW or IA. However, since this subject does not belong to the sub 
sample of 52 subjects from Part 1, we do not need to take a decision on her type.    24 
     Table 11 shows, as Table 5 did for Part 1, the frequency of actions taken by each 
preferences type. Comparing Table 5 and Table 11, we observe that the distribution of 
average frequencies with which overall the three actions were played (the last row in 
both tables) is practically identical to that of Part 1. However, when we look in Table 11 
at  the  average  frequency  with  which  each  preferences type  took  each  of  the  three 
actions, we observe that preferences types are now more clearly separated. Again we 
find that SF type barely took any but the selfish action, no matter their relative position 
(93%). The SW type now took the surplus creating action with highest frequency (76%) 
and while they sometimes (24%) took the selfish action, they never took the surplus 
destroying action. The IA type mainly took selfish (48%) and surplus creating actions 
when ahead but they choose most frequently (80%) the selfish action and much less 
frequently (8%) the surplus destroying action when behind. Finally, the CP type almost 
never created surplus (9% when ahead, 0% when behind) and chose selfish and surplus 
destroying actions in similar percentages (52% and 42%, respectively).  
     In Table 12, we find that the preferences type distribution is robust across different 
specifications. SF preferences are the most frequent, with a frequency  varying from 
58% to 74%. SW preferences appear in a proportion varying from 13% to 10% of the 
subjects.  IA  preferences  appear  with  a  frequency  varying  from  26%  to  9%,  of  the 
subjects. Finally, CP preferences’ frequencies vary from 13% to 5%. Again, SF types 
are classified with the least noise (e=0.03) while IA and CP subjects are classified with 
highest level of noise (e=0.23). For the rest of the analysis we focus on the individual by 
individual specification where 58% of subjects are estimated to have SF preferences, 
15% of the subjects are estimated to have IA preferences and SW and CP preferences 
are estimated to have a frequency of 13% each in the population. 
     We now check whether actions and preferences types were consistent between Part 1 
and Part 3 of the experiment. As a first approximation, we find that subjects changed 
their action from Part 1 to Part 3 on average in 1.31 tables out of 16 decision tables 
(8.2% of the time). Subjects classified as SF according to their actions in Part 1, were 
actually the ones who changed their actions the least (2.7% of the time). SW and IA 
subjects changed their actions more often on average, in 4 and 5 out of 16 decision 
tables (25% and 32% of the time, respectively). CP subjects changed their action in 3.20 
tables on average (20%).  
     More precisely, Table 13 presents an overall contingency table where rows refer to 
the preferences type classification in Part 1 and columns refer to the preferences type   25 
classification in Part 3. The diagonal cells of this table show the number of subjects who 
did not change preferences type from Part 1 to Part 3 of the experiment. Off diagonal 
cells present the number of subjects who changed type from row’s preferences type to 
column’s preferences type. The majority of subjects (69.23%, 36 out of 52), did not 
change their preferences type from Part 1 to Part 3.
38 The number in the diagonal cells 
is  always  higher  than  in  any  other  cell.  Consistently,  subjects  who  changed  type 
changed an average of 2.65 actions from Part 1 to Part 3 (16.6%), while subjects who 
did not changed type changed an average of 0.70 actions (4.4%). 
     Moreover, there are significant differences if we compare the likelihood of changing 
types across different rows, and therefore, across different preferences types. Consistent 
with the finding in changes on actions, subjects estimated as having SF preferences are 
the ones who changed the least their preferences type from Part 1 to Part 3. Only 1 
subject out of 23 actually switched type. On the other hand, almost half of the subjects 
estimated  as  having  SW  preferences  in  Part  1  actually  switched  type.  Also,  most 
subjects estimated as having IA preferences, 8 out of 13, switched type from Part 1 to 
Part 3. Finally, 2 out of 5 subjects estimated as having CP preferences switched to a 
different type. We can conclude that while SF preference type is very stable, SW, IA 
and  CP  preferences types  show  less  stability.
39  If  we  order  preferences types  with 
respect to a decreasing level of altruism (SW  IA  SF  CP), Table 13 shows that the 
majority of the subjects who changed type (13 out of 16) moved from a more altruistic 
type to a less altruistic one. Also, as a measure of stability in the classification, subjects 
did not change their type dramatically. For example, no subject classified as SW in Part 
1 was classified as CP in Part 3 and vice versa.  
     The switch in actions and in preferences types might come as a result of purification 
of those confused or noisy subjects. That is, since it is the second time subjects go over 
the same decision tables, now they may have a better idea of what their preferred choice 
is and therefore, there may be less confusion.
40 It is important to look at the noise level 
in Part 1 of those who switched preferences types in comparison to the noise level of 
                                                 
38 The Kappa test, a chance corrected measured of agreement between two classifications, yields a value 
of 0.5372. Therefore, we conclude that there exists agreement between both classifications. In any case, 
this value partially comes from the high proportion of subjects which were consistently classified as SF 
both in Part 1 and Part 3 of the experiment. 
39  Pair wise  Fisher  Exact  tests  comparing  the  classification  in  Part  3  of  the  experiment  of  subjects 
classified under the four types in Part 1, allows us to conclude that there exists significant differences 
between the SF type and SW, IA and CP types (p values of 1.05e
 06, 3.34e
 05 and 0.01, respectively). 
Fisher tests also show significant difference between SW and CP types (p value=0.008).  
40 The best test for this hypothesis is to repeat the experiments with the same design with a treatment in 
which no information was provided in the third part of the experiment. As an alternative approximation 
we compare the noise levels of those who change and do not change preferences types.    26 
those who did not. The sixteen subjects who changed type were actually identified in 
the first part of the experiment with a higher level of noise than those who did not 
change type. Using the individual by individual classification, subjects who changed 
type were identified with an average level of noise of e=0.19, while subjects who did 
not were identified with an average level of noise of e=0.05. However, the main reason 
behind this result is the existence of a majority of SF type subjects who do not change 
type and whose noise level is the lowest (e=0.02). SW, IA and CP type subjects who 
changed and who did not change type are estimated with similar levels of noise in Part 
1.
41 This suggests that the substantive change in actions and therefore in preferences 
types is not totally explained by simple purification of those noisy or confused subjects, 
but that it is at least partly due to the information provided.  
     We can further aim to investigate the effect of providing information about other 
subjects’ actions on the classification of subjects from Part 1 to Part 3. Notice that the 
actions observed by subjects differed for the different groups of ten participants, A and 
B,  in  each  of  the  three  experimental  sessions.  Therefore,  we  have  six  independent 
observations of other Deciders’ actions. Our analysis is limited to these six different sets 
of information and to the relative variability in observations which naturally occurred. 
Without  differentiating  for  the  Decider’s  relative  position  or  for  different  decision 
tables, the 6 different aggregated observed actions are given in Table 14, where the 
numbers refer to the Session and the letter to groups A and B.  
     A Chi Square test rejects the hypothesis that these 6 different distributions of other 
participants’ actions are equal (p value 4.72E 11), and therefore, they cannot be pooled. 
However, a pair wise Fisher’s Exact test shows that observed data in 1 A cannot be 
rejected to be equal to that in 2 A (p value 0.62), also data in 1 B cannot be rejected to 
be equal to that in 3 A (p value 0.40), and finally that data in 2 B cannot be rejected to 
be equal to that in 3 B (p value 0.57)
42. These three different observations of Deciders’ 
actions show that most of Deciders are taking the selfish action but apart from that they 
offer a different view of what Deciders are doing in the decision tables. Set 1 A and 2 A 
show relatively  few Deciders taking the surplus creating and even fewer taking the 
surplus destroying action. The second set of observations, consisting of 1 B and 3 A, 
                                                 
41 Noise levels for SW type who change and do not change type are e=0.23 and e=0.14, respectively. For 
IA subjects, noise levels are e=0.17 and e=0.19 for individuals who change and do not change type 
respectively. Finally for CP subjects, noise levels are e=0.09 and e=0.09 for those who change and do not 
change type respectively. 
42 Fisher Exact test cannot either reject that 1 A is equal to 3 B but since this p value (0.34) is lower than 
the p value (0.57) when 2 B and 3 B are compared, we decided to pool 2 B and 3 B.   27 
shows  that  almost  equal  number  of  Deciders  are  taking  the  surplus  creating  and 
destroying actions. Finally, the third set, given by 2 B and 3 B, shows a fair amount of 
Deciders  taking  the  surplus  creating  action  and  almost  no one  taking  the  surplus 
destroying action. 
       We  can  therefore  replicate  the  contingency  Table  13,  separately  for  these  three 
subgroups of different observations described above.
43 Most SW subjects happened to 
observe a distribution of actions given by 1 A and 2 A, which shows a higher frequency 
of selfish action than in any other observation, as shown in Table 15. Out of 5 subjects 
classified  as  SW,  two  subjects  switched  to  SF  preferences type  and  another  one 
switched to IA preferences. Most IA subjects happened to observe a fair amount of 
surplus creating action but very little of surplus destroying action, as shown in Table 17. 
Out of 6 subjects classified as IA, two subjects switched to Selfish preferences and other 
two switched to SW preferences. Tables 15 and 17 show that the observed distribution 
of actions over the sixteen tables did have an impact on the actions, and therefore, in the 
type classification of SW and IA types, but had no impact on SF types.
44  
     Overall, we conclude that almost 70% of subjects did not change preferences type. 
Therefore,  interdependent  preferences types  seem  to  show  robustness  to  belief 
elicitation  and  provision  of  social  information.  This  robustness  is  compatible  with 
previous evidence by Brandts and Fatás (2001), who observe little indication of social 
influence in a public good game and thus, in a strategic environment. However, in our 
non strategic setting there are important differences across different preferences types. 
While  Selfish  subjects  never  change  type,  other  preferences types  show  much  less 
stability. Our results are consistent with Cason and Mui (1998), where they show, in a 
twice repeated  regular  dictator  game  in  which  dictators  are  informed  of  a  previous 
choice by another single dictator, that subjects who are more self regarding on their first 
decisions are less likely to change choices between their first and second decisions. 
Notice that this result seems intuitive up to some extend: SF individuals who do not care 
                                                 
43 This is done in Tables 15, 16 and 17. Kappa tests measuring agreement between row and column 
classifications yield values 0.502, 0.781 and 0.304 for Tables 15, 16 and 17 respectively. Therefore, we 
can reject the independence hypothesis between rows and columns. Furthermore, pair wise Fisher Exact 
tests comparing the classification in Part 3 of the experiment of subjects classified under the four different 
preferences types in Part 1, allows us to conclude that there are significant differences across types. In 
particular in Table 15, the SF type is significantly different from SW type (p value of 0.037) and also 
from the IA type (p value of 0.015). In Table 16, SF type is significantly different from SW (p value of 
0.006). Finally, in Table 17, SF type is significantly different from IA type (p value of 0.025).  
44  Disaggregating  this  data  into  the  three  different  observations  of  information  limits  the  number  of 
individuals  to  20  subjects  each  time,  reducing  dramatically  the  number  of  observations  of  subjects 
classified as SW, IA and CP. This caveat could be partly solved at the cost of having more subjects or 
complicating the design (or incurring in deception). Further research on this topic, using a specific design 
to study the effect of information on the stability of interdependent preferences will follow.    28 
about  others’  payoffs  are  not  affected  by  others’  actions,  while  other’  regarding 
individuals (SW, IA or CP) are more affected by others’ choices.  
 
7.  Conclusions 
     We have designed a modified dictator game experiment which allows us to classify 
subjects into four different interdependent preferences types. We have elicited beliefs 
Deciders  hold  about  other  Deciders’  actions,  and  we  have  provided  Deciders  with 
information  regarding  other  Deciders’  actions.  Our  analysis  shows  that  while  some 
individuals may be aware of the existence of heterogeneity in actions and therefore 
interdependent preferences, it is wrong to assume that they all hold the same beliefs. 
The  most  prominent  interdependent  preferences type  is  Selfish,  and  all  existent 
preferences types are aware of this. However, while Selfish individuals do not believe 
others  incur  in  personal  costs  to  create  or  destroy  surplus,  individuals  with 
interdependent  preferences  are  aware  that  there  may  exist  others  taking  different 
actions.  Social  Welfare  maximizers  hold  the  most  accurate  beliefs  about  the 
heterogeneity in actions. We also show that different types of individuals are affected 
differently by social information. When providing information about others’ previous 
choices, Selfish types barely change their choices, while Social Welfare maximizers, 
Inequity Averse and Competitive individuals show to be sensitive to this information. In 
particular,  we  show  that  those  individuals  with interdependent  preferences,  who  are 
affected by social information, tend to behave more selfishly. 
     Our  empirical  analysis  has  been  carried  out  in  a  decision  making  (non strategic) 
setting  due  to  two  reasons.  First,  we  aimed  to  identify  purely  distributional  or 
interdependent preferences. Second, we aimed to study the role beliefs play, as well as 
the effect social information has, in purely distributional or interdependent preferences. 
Our results have important implications for modeling and interpreting behavior both in 
non strategic  and  strategic  interactions  between  individuals  with  heterogeneous 
preferences. The experimental results reported in this paper show that interdependent 
preferences that only include payoff differences among players might be too limited to 
capture other regarding preferences because beliefs and knowledge about what others 
choose, despite not affecting directly own payoffs, might actually play an important role 
determining behavior.  
In charitable giving or public good settings, heterogeneous beliefs about others’ 
contributions may affect contributions. Moreover, providing information on what other   29 
decision  makers  have  contributed  might  be  an  effective  and  powerful  tool,  if  used 
appropriately,  on  increasing  contributions.  Fundraisers  should  carefully  design  what 
information should be provided keeping always in mind the target donor. We aim to 
develop these ideas in future research. 
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9. Appendix 
 





























Figure 2. Decision Table 
 
  S 
(Selfish Action) 
C 
(Surplus Creating Action) 
D 
(Surplus Destroying Action) 
Decider  x  x-1  x-1 
Receiver  y  y+s  y-s 
 




Option 1  Option 2  Option 3    Table 2 
(s=5) 
Option 1  Option 2  Option 3 
Decider  7  7  8    Decider  16  17  16 




Option 1  Option 2  Option 3    Table 4 
(s=7) 
Option 1  Option 2  Option 3 
Decider  20  19  19    Decider  10  10  11 




Option 1  Option 2  Option 3    Table 6 
(s=3) 
Option 1  Option 2  Option 3 
Decider  17  16  16    Decider  8  7  7 




Option 1  Option 2  Option 3    Table 8 
(s=5) 
Option 1  Option 2  Option 3 
Decider  17  16  16    Decider  8  7  7 























 iv) Competitive Preferences (CP)   34 
Table 9 
(s=6) 
Option 1  Option 2  Option 3    Table 10 
(s=4) 
Option 1  Option 2  Option 3 
Decider  13  14  13    Decider  4  5  4 




Option 1  Option 2  Option 3    Table 12 
(s=4) 
Option 1  Option 2  Option 3 
Decider  16  16  17    Decider  20  19  19 




Option 1  Option 2  Option 3    Table 14 
(s=6) 
Option 1  Option 2  Option 3 
Decider  4  4  5    Decider  7  7  8 




Option 1  Option 2  Option 3    Table 16 
(s=5) 
Option 1  Option 2  Option 3 
Decider  13  13  14    Decider  10  10  11 




Table 1. Actions in Part 1 of the Experiment 
  Decider’s Position: Ahead  Decider’s Position: Behind   




















of Actions  316  142  22  346  80  54 
960 
Average by 
subject  5.27  2.37  0.37  5.77  1.33  0.90 
16 
Stand. Dev.  (2.79)  (2.65)  (1.13)  (2.54)  (2.17)  (1.90)   
Frequency 




Table 2. Elicited Beliefs 
  Decider’s Position: Ahead    Decider’s Position: Behind 



















Average  0.73  0.16  0.11  1  0.76  0.12  0.13  1 
Stand. Dev.  (0.23)  (0.17)  (0.13)    (0.22)  (0.15)  (0.16)   
 
Table 3. Actions in Part 3 of the Experiment 
  Decider’s Position: Ahead  Decider’s Position: Behind   




















of Actions  342  114  24  374  69  37 
960 
Average  5.7  1.9  0.4  6.23  1.15  0.62  16 
Stand. Dev.  (2.8)  (2.7)  (1.29)  (2.59)  (2.33)  (1.63)   
Frequency 
of Play  0.71  0.24  0.05  0.78  0.14  0.08 
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Table 4. Individual by Individual Estimation (Part 1) 

























1  1  5  2  2  0  6  0.34  -1.01  0.38  11.77  IA 
2  5  3  0  5  2  1  0.17  0.14  0.28  9.80  SW 
3  8  0  0  7  1  0  0  0  0.09  4.43  SF 
4  8  0  0  8  0  0  0  0  0  0  SF 
5  8  0  0  6  0  2  0  0  0.19  7.41  SF 
6  8  0  0  8  0  0  0  0  0  0  SF 
7  8  0  0  8  0  0  0  0  0  0  SF 
8  0  8  0  2  6  0  0.34  0.34  0.19  7.41  SW 
9  8  0  0  8  0  0  0  0  0  0  SF 
10  8  0  0  8  0  0  0  0  0  0  SF 
11  8  0  0  8  0  0  0  0  0  0  SF 
12  4  4  0  4  4  0  0.30  0.16  0.56  14.74  SW* 
13  3  4  1  5  3  0  0.26  [-0.15,0]  0.47  13.40  IA* 
14  8  0  0  8  0  0  0  0  0  0  SF 
15  6  2  0  1  0  7  0  -0.51  0.19  7.41  CP 
16  8  0  0  8  0  0  0  0  0  0  SF 
17  2  6  0  3  0  5  0.34  -0.51  0.28  9.80  IA 
18  5  2  1  4  0  4  -0.2  -0.51  0.47  13.40  CP* 
19  4  4  0  4  4  0  0.17  0.17  0.19  7.41  SW 
20  6  0  2  2  0  6  -0.2  -0.51  0.09  4.43  CP 
21  1  7  0  4  2  2  0.34  0.13  0.38  11.77  SW 
22  8  0  0  8  0  0  0  0  0  0  SF 
23  7  0  1  7  1  0  0  0  0.19  7.41  SF 
24  8  0  0  8  0  0  0  0  0  0  SF 
25  4  4  0  6  2  0  0.26  0.13  0.19  7.41  SW 
26  5  3  0  7  0  1  0.21  0  0.19  7.41  IA 
27  8  0  0  8  0  0  0  0  0  0  SF 
28  2  5  1  8  0  0  0.26  [-0.15,0]  0.09  4.43  IA 
29  0  8  0  7  1  0  0.34  0  0.09  4.43  IA 
30  8  0  0  8  0  0  0  0  0  0  SF 
31  2  6  0  5  3  0  [0.25, 0.27]  0.17  0.19  7.41  SW 
32  3  4  1  1  6  1  0.26  0.34  0.47  13.40  SW* 
33  7  0  1  6  0  2  0  -0.21  0.09  4.43  CP 
34  8  0  0  8  0  0  0  0  0  0  SF 
35  8  0  0  8  0  0  0  0  0  0  SF 
36  4  4  0  8  0  0  0.34  [-0.16,0]  0.19  7.41  IA 
37  0  8  0  0  8  0  0.34  0.34  0  0  SW 
38  6  2  0  5  3  0  [0,0.13]  [0.13, 0.17]  0.38  11.77  SW 
39  3  5  0  6  2  0  0.26  0  0.38  11.77  IA 
40  7  1  0  4  0  4  [0.03, 0.13]  -0.34  0.28  9.80  IA 
41  6  2  0  6  2  0  0.13  0.13  0.09  4.43  SW 
42  1  7  0  0  8  0  0.34  0.34  0.09  4.43  SW 
43  7  1  0  7  0  1  0  -0.17  0.09  4.43  CP 
44  0  0  8  0  0  8  -1.01  -1.01  0  0  CP 
45  8  0  0  8  0  0  0  0  0  0  SF 
46  4  4  0  8  0  0  0.26  0  0.09  4.43  IA 
47  8  0  0  8  0  0  0  0  0  0  SF 
48  7  1  0  7  1  0  0.13  0  0.09  4.43  IA 
49  0  8  0  1  7  0  0.34  0.26  0  0  SW 
50  4  3  1  7  1  0  0.21  0  0.38  11.77  IA 
51  2  6  0  7  1  0  0.21  0  0.28  9.80  IA 
52  7  1  0  8  0  0  0.13  0  0  0  IA 
53  8  0  0  7  0  1  0  0  0.09  4.43  SF 
54  5  3  0  2  6  0  -0.13  0.34  0.47  13.40  * 
55  8  0  0  8  0  0  0  0  0  0  SF 
56  8  0  0  8  0  0  0  0  0  0  SF 
57  2  5  1  5  2  1  [0.3, 0.34]  [0.01, 0.11]  0.47  13.40  SW* 
58  8  0  0  7  1  0  0  0  0.09  4.43  SF 
59  4  4  0  4  3  1  [0.17, 0.21]  [-0.33,-0.26]  0.47  13.40  IA* 
60  4  2  2  7  0  1  [0, 0.26]  0  0.47  13.40  SF or IA?* 
* Subjects estimated to have an error higher than 0.38 and thus, not considered in the subsequent analysis with 52 subjects. 
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Table 5. Frequency of Play Separately for Preferences-types (Part 1) (N=52 Subjects) 




  S  C  D  S  C  D  S  C  D 
SF  0.98  0.01  0.01  0.99          0.97  0.02  0.01 
SW  0.38  0.60  0.02  0.32  0.67  0.00  0.43  0.53  0.03 
IA  0.62  0.27  0.09  0.46  0.50  0.04  0.78  0.06  0.15 
CP  0.525  0.04  0.44  0.65  0.07  0.27  0.4      0.6 
TOTAL  0.72  0.20  0.07  0.69  0.27  0.04  0.75  0.13  0.11 
 
 
Table 6. Interdependent Preferences-Type Estimation for Different Specifications (Part 1) 
  Individual by Individual 
Estimation (Summary) 
Population Estimation: 




k p   k r   k s   k e   k p   k r   k s   k e   k p   k r   k s   e  
SF  0.44          0.03  0.52          0.05  0.63          0.21 
SW  0.21  0.25  0.21  0.18  0.08  0.34  0.34  0.09  0.09  0.34   0.33  0.21 
IA  0.25  0.24   0.16  0.21  0.32  0.29   0.01  0.44  0.22  0.33   0.04  0.21 
CP  0.10   0.34   0.38  0.07  0.09   0.22   0.76  0.47  0.06   0.21   0.99  0.21 




Table 7. Expected Frequency of Play 
Separately for Preferences-types 








SF  0.92  0.04  0.04 
SW  0.61  0.28  0.11 
IA  0.71  0.14  0.15 
CP  0.66  0.08  0.25 
Average  0.78  0.12  0.10 
 
Table 8: Belief-Type Identification for Different Specifications 











LL   
k p  
k SbA  
k CbA   k DbA  
k SbB   k CbB   k DbB  
LL 
K=1  (1)     
0.78  0.12  0.10 
 
 571.89 
(5)     
0.76  0.14  0.10  0.79  0.10  0.11 
 
 570.24 
    Restricted: (1) 
Unrestricted: (5)          p value=0.19 
K=2  (2) 




0.52  0.93  0.04  0,03  0.95  0.03  0.02 
 
 524.71 
    0.47  0.59  0.22  0.19      0.48  0.58  0.25  0.17  0.61  0.18  0.21   
  Restricted: (1) 
Unrestricted: (2)         p-value=0.21*E18 
Restricted: (2) 
Unrestricted: (6)          p value=0.37 
K=3  (3) 




0.55  0.92  0.05  0.03  0.94  0.03  0.03 
 
 510.22 
    0,20  0.64  0.32  0.04      0.20  0.5935  0.36  0.05  0.679  0.28  0.04   
    0.25  0.54  0.14  0.31      0.25  0.5506  0.18  0.27  0.542  0.11  0.35   
  Restricted: (2) 
Unrestricted: (3)         p-value=0.000003 
Restricted: (3) 
Unrestricted: (7)          p value=0.57 
K=4  (4) 




0.48  0.94  0.03  0.03  0.96  0.02  0.02 
 
 506.78 
    0.25  0.72  0.23  0.05      0.27  0.68  0.27  0.05  0.76  0.18  0.06   
    0.24  0.53  0.15  0.32      0.24  0.54  0.17  0.28  0.53  0.11  0.36   
    0.02  0.27  0.70  0.03      0.02  0.30  0.65  0.05  0.23  0.76  0.01   
  Restricted: (3) 
Unrestricted: (4)         p value=0.12 
Restricted: (4) 
Unrestricted: (8)          p value=0.67   37 
 
Table 9. Frequency Table for Interdependent Preferences-Types and Belief-Types 




Belief Type 1 
(0.93, 0.04, 0.03) 
Belief Type 2 
(0.64, 0.32, 0.04) 
Belief Type 3 




SF  19  2  2  23 
SW  2  6  3  11 
IA  5  3  5  13 
CP  2  --  3  5 
TOTAL  28  11  13  52 
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Table 10. Individual by Individual Estimation (Part 3) 
  Decider’s Position: Ahead  Decider’s Position: Behind  Estimation   






















1  5  0  3  1  0  7   0.17   1.01  0.28  9.80  CP 
2  5  1  2  5  1  2  [0.13, 0.17]  0  0.47  13.4  IA
++ 
3  8  0  0  8  0  0  0  0  0  0  SF 
4  8  0  0  8  0  0  0  0  0  0  SF 
5  6  0  2  8  0  0   0.17  0  0.09  4.43  CP 
6  8  0  0  8  0  0  0  0  0  0  SF 
7  8  0  0  8  0  0  0  0  0  0  SF 
8  0  8  0  0  8  0  0.34  0.34  0  0  SW 
9  8  0  0  8  0  0  0  0  0  0  SF 
10  8  0  0  8  0  0  0  0  0  0  SF 
11  8  0  0  8  0  0  0  0  0  0  SF 
12  4  4  0  7  1  0  0.34  [ 0.16, 0]  0.28  9.80  IA* 
13  2  6  0  4  0  4  0.34   0.34  0.19  7.41  IA* 
14  8  0  0  8  0  0  0  0  0  0  SF 
15  5  3  0  6  0  2  [0, 0.34]   0.26  0.38  11.77  IA or CP
+ 
16  8  0  0  8  0  0  0  0  0  0  SF 
17  6  1  1  5  0  3  0  [ 0.34, 0.17]  0.38  11.77  CP 
18  7  1  0  7  1  0  0  0  0.19  7.41  SF* 
19  4  4  0  5  3  0  0.17  0.17  0.28  9.80  SW 
20  4  0  4  3  0  5  [ 1,  0.51]  [ 0.51,  0.26]  0.47  13.40  CP
++ 
21  1  7  0  4  2  2  0.34  0  0.09  4.43  IA 
22  8  0  0  8  0  0  0  0  0  0  SF 
23  7  0  1  7  1  0  0  0  0  0  SF 
24  8  0  0  8  0  0  0  0  0  0  SF 
25  4  4  0  6  2  0  0  0  0  0  SF 
26  5  3  0  7  0  1  [0.17, 0.21]  0  0.19  7.41  IA 
27  8  0  0  8  0  0  0  0  0.09  4.43  SF 
28  2  5  1  8  0  0  0  0  0  0  SF 
29  0  8  0  7  1  0  0.34  0.17  0.19  7.41  SW 
30  8  0  0  8  0  0  0  0  0  0  SF 
31  2  6  0  5  3  0  0  0  0.38  11.77  SF 
32  3  4  1  1  6  1  [0.13, 0.17]  [0.143, 0.17]  0.47  13.40  SW*
,++ 
33  7  0  1  6  0  2  0  0  0  0  SF 
34  8  0  0  8  0  0  0  0  0  0  SF 
35  8  0  0  8  0  0  0  0  0  0  SF 
36  4  4  0  8  0  0  0.13  0  0.19  7.41  IA 
37  0  8  0  0  8  0  0.34  0.34  0  0  SW 
38  6  2  0  5  3  0  0.26  0.26  0.09  4.43  SW 
39  3  5  0  6  2  0  0.34  [ 0.16, 0]  0.38  11.77  IA 
40  7  1  0  4  0  4  0   0.17  0  0  CP 
41  6  2  0  8  0  0  0.13  0  0.09  4.43  IA 
42  0  8  0  0  8  0  0.34  0.34  0  0  SW 
43  8  0  0  8  0  0  0  0  0  0  SF 
44  0  0  8  0  0  8   1.01   1.01  0  0  CP 
45  8  0  0  8  0  0  0  0  0  0  SF 
46  3  5  0  8  0  0  0.26  0  0  0  IA 
47  8  0  0  8  0  0  0  0  0  0  SF 
48  8  0  0  8  0  0  0  0  0  0  SF 
49  0  8  0  0  8  0  0.34  0.34  0  0  SW 
50  6  2  0  5  3  0  0  [0, 0.13]  0.47  13.40  SF ?
+,++ 
51  4  4  0  5  3  0  0.21  0  0.47  13.40  IA
++ 
52  8  0  0  8  0  0  0  0  0  0  SF 
53  8  0  0  8  0  0  0  0  0  0  SF 
54  5  3  0  3  5  0  0.13  0.13  0.47  13.40  SW*
,++ 
55  8  0  0  8  0  0  0  0  0  0  SF 
56  8  0  0  8  0  0  0  0  0  0  SF 
57  2  3  3  7  0  1  [0.26, 0.34]  0  0.56  14.74  IA* 
58  8  0  0  8  0  0  0  0  0  0  SF 
59 
3  5  0  5  3  0  0.34  [ 0.19, 0.13]  0.38  11.77 
SW or 
IA?* 
60  8  0  0  8  0  0  0  0  0  0  SF* 
* Subjects estimated in Part 1 with an error higher than 0.38 and thus, eliminated not considered in from the sub sample of 52 subjects. 
+ Subjects that allow for different type classifications in Part 3 and for which a subjective classification was used (see footnote 36). 
++ Subjects estimated in Part 3 with an error higher than 0.38.   39 
 
Table 11. Frequency of Play Separately for Preferences-types (Part 3) (N=52 Subjects) 




  S  C  D  S  C  D  S  C  D 
SF  0.93  0.05  0.01  0.92  0.07  0.01  0.95  0.04  0.01 
SW  0.24  0.76      0.18  0.82      0.30  0.69     
IA  0.64  0.30  0.05  0.48  0.48  0.03  0.80  0.12  0.08 
CP  0.53  0.04  0.42  0.59  0.09  0.32  0.48      0.52 
TOTAL  0.74  0.19  0.07  0.71  0.24  0.05  0.78  0.13  0.09 
 
 
Table 12. Interdependent Preferences-Type Estimation for Different Specifications (Part 3) 
  Individual by Individual 
Estimation (Summary) 
Population Estimation: 




k p   k r   k s   k e   k p   k r   k s   k e   k p   k r   k s   e  
SF  0.58          0.03  0.59          0.01  0.74          0.14 
SW  0.13  0.30  0.28  0.08  0.10  0.33  0.33  0.06  0.11  0.34  0.33  0.14 
IA  0.15  0.22   0.01  0.23  0.26  0.25   0.06  0.45  0.09  0.34   0.03  0.14 
CP  0.13   0.28   0.44  0.23  0.05   0.70   0.66  0.41  0.06   0.75   0.81  0.14 
LL   164.71   315.68   352.04 
 
Table 13. Interdependent Preferences-Type Classification in Parts 1 and 3 
  Preferences Types Part 3   
Preferences Types Part 1  SF  SW  IA  CP  TOTAL 
SF  22          1  23 
SW  2  6  3      11 
IA  4  1  5  3  13 
CP  2          3  5 
TOTAL  30  7  8  7  52 
 




Observed number of 
Selfish Action 
Observed number of 
Surplus Creating Action 
Observed number of 
Surplus Destroying Action 
Total 
1 A  122  24  14  160 
1 B  103  34  23  160 
2 A  126  25  9  160 
2 B  95  60  5  160 
3 A  113  25  22  160 
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Table 15. Interdependent Preferences-Type Classification in Parts 1 and 3 (1-A and 2-A) 
  Preferences Types Part 3   
Preferences Types Part 1  SF  SW  IA  CP  TOTAL 
SF  6  --  --  1  7 
SW  2  2  2  --  6 
IA  --  --  2  2  4 
CP  --  --  --  2  2 
TOTAL  8  2  4  5  19 
 
Table 16. Interdependent Preferences-Type Classification in Parts 1 and 3 (3-A and 1-B) 
  Preferences Types Part 3   
Preferences Types Part 1  SF  SW  IA  CP  TOTAL 
SF  8  --  --  --  8 
SW  --  2  1  --  3 
IA  1  --  2  --  3 
CP  --  --  --  1  1 
TOTAL  9  2  3  1  15 
 
Table 17. Interdependent Preferences-Type Classification in Parts 1 and 3 (2-B and 3-B) 
  Preferences Types Part 3   
Preferences Types Part 1  SF  SW  IA  CP  TOTAL 
SF  8  --  --  --  8 
SW  --  --  --  --     
IA  3  2  1  1  7 
CP  2  --  --  1  3 



























Below you can find a translation of the experimental instructions which were handed to 
Deciders sequentially and read aloud before each part. A summary of these instructions 
appeared on subjects' screens before each part. 
     
Instructions read to all subjects (“Deciders” and “Receivers”).  
 
THANK YOU FOR PARTICIPATING IN OUR EXPERIMENT! 
     
This is an experiment and thus, no talking, looking around or walking is allowed. If you have any 
question or need help please raise your hand and one of the researchers will assist you. If you do not 
follow the indicated rules, WE WILL ASK YOU TO LEAVE THE EXPERIMENT AND YOU 
WILL NOT RECEIVE ANY PAYMENT. Thank you. 
 
This experiment is about individual decisions. Both Pompeu Fabra and  Autònoma de Barcelona 
universities have provided funds to carry it out. You will receive 3 euros for having arrived on 
time. Additionally, if you follow the instructions correctly you may earn more money. 
 
The experiment has three parts. Before each part, we will let you know about the tasks you have to 
do and how your decisions will affect your payments. Everything you earn will be for you and paid 
in cash inside a closed envelope in a strictly private way at the end of the experimental session. 
 
Each participant has a strictly confidential "Experiment Code" to guarantee that no participant can 
identify another one by his/her decisions nor earnings. Researchers will observe each participant’s  
earnings at the end of the experiment but we will not associate your decisions with any participants’ 
names.  
 
Your Experiment Code is: XXXXX 
 
The experiment consists of three parts. Your final payment will be the sum of a participation 
fee of the 3 euros plus whatever you earn in the three parts of the experiment. 
 
Each experimental point corresponds to 25 Euro cents. 
 
Thus, if you obtain a total of 32 points, you will receive a total of 11 euros (3 for participating 
and 8 from converting 32 experimental points into euros at a rate of 4 experimental point * 0.25 
= 1 Euro). 
 
If, for example, you obtain 10 experimental points, you will receive 5.5 Euros (10*0.25=2.5 + 3 
=5.5). 
 
If, for example, you obtain 70 experimental points, you will receive 20.5 Euros (70*0.25=17.5 + 
3 = 20.5). 
  
There are 40 participants in this experiment, 20 in the laboratory to whom we refer to as “Deciders” 
and 20 in a classroom to whom we refer to as “Receivers”. 
 
As you have observed, who is a “Decider” (and stayed in the laboratory) and who is a “Receiver” 
(and went to the classroom) has been randomly decided by extracting a paper from a bag. 
 
“Deciders” take decisions which affect their payments and the payments of other participants in the 
experiment. “Receivers” do not take any decision, which affect neither their payments nor those of 
other participants in the experiment. When the experiment concludes, we will first pay “Deciders” in 
private. Once “Deciders” have left, “Receivers” will come to the laboratory and will be paid in 
private. 
 
The 20 “Deciders” have been divided in two groups of 10 subjects each: “group A” and “group B”. 
You belong to Group A (B). If you are a “Receiver” you do not belong to any group. 
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PART 1 is about to start. Please wait until everyone has read the instructions for PART 1.  
 
Instructions for Deciders’ Task 1 
 
PART 1  
In this part of the experiment we are going to show you 16 tables. The 16 tables the computer will 
show you will look as follows:  
 
  Option 1  Option 2  Option 3 
Decider  8  7  11 
Receiver  17  19  13 
 
In each of the tables you must choose between "Option 1", "Option 2" and "Option 3". Each of these 
3 options describes how many experimental points a participant ("Decider") receives and how many 
another randomly matched participant ("Receiver") gets. 
 
At no time a participant will know who they are matched with in any table. 
 
When the experiment is over, the computer will randomly choose one of the 16 tables to determine 
the payments for PART 1. 
 
You will receive the amount of experimental points corresponding to “Decider” in the chosen table 
and  your  matched  participant  will  receive  the  number  of  experimental  points  corresponding  to 
“Receiver” in the same table. 
 
For example, if the chosen table was the one that appears above and you had chosen "Option 2", you 
would obtain 7 experimental points while your matched participant would obtain 19 experimental 
points. 
 
Notice that the numbers in the example are just for illustrative purposes. They DO NOT intend 
to suggest how anyone may choose among the different options. 
 
Participants in the other classroom (“Receivers”) can not take any decision which may affect your 
payments or their payments. 
 
What you earn and what your matched participant (“Receiver”) earns depends only on your decisions 
and on the randomly chosen table. 
 
Once you have chosen your option in a particular table, please press "OK" and wait for the other 
participants to make their choice before moving to the next table.  
  
Instructions for Deciders’ Task 2 
 
PART 2  
 
In this part of the experiment the computer will show you the same 16 tables you saw in PART 1, 
although the tables may appear in a different order than before. 
 
Remember that we have divided the 20 participants in the experiment in two groups of 10 people 
("group A" and "group B"). In the first part of the experiment all “Deciders” have chosen among the 
three options having as a matched participant another subject from the other room (“Receivers”).  
 
Now  you  will have to guess how  many out of the 10 “Deciders” from the other group ("group 
A"/"group B") have chosen each option ("Option 1", "Option 2" and "Option 3") in each of the 16 
tables in PART 1 of the experiment. 
 
For example, in one of the tables you may write:  
 
    Option 1: 6 
    Option 2: 3 
    Option 3: 1  
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This would mean that you think that in this particular table, 6 out of the 10 participants in Group B 
(A), chose "Option 1", 3 chose "Option 2 and 1 chose "Option 3". 
 
Notice that the numbers in the example are just for illustrative purposes. They DO NOT intend 
to suggest how anyone may choose among the different options. 
 
When the experiment is over, the computer will randomly choose one of the 16 tables to make 
payments for PART 2. You will receive more money the closer your guesses are to what participants 
from Group B (A) actually chose in PART 1. 
 
You will be paid according to the mathematical formula which appears below. Do not worry if you 
do not understand the formula exactly. What is important is that you understand that the closer the 
numbers you write to the number of participants who actually chose each option the more money you 
will receive. 
 
For example, if you write that 6 participants choose "Option 1" and actually 6 participants chose 
"Option 1", you will receive more money than if 5 or 7 participants chose "Option 1". 
 
Notice that in this part of the experiment your answer can only affect your payments, and not those of 
any other participant, either from your group or the other group. 
 
Here is the formula:  
 
Experimental Points in PART 2 = 20   0.01 * [(a X)²+(b Y)²+(c Z)²], where:  
 
a: Number of participants you think choose "Option 1" 
b: Number of participants you think choose "Option 2" 
c: Number of participants you think choose "Option 3" 
X: Number of participants who actually chose "Option 1" 
Y: Number of participants who actually chose "Option 2" 
Z: Number of participants who actually chose "Option 3"  
 
Please read the following examples to see how the formula works:  
 
  In one table, you write that 6 participants choose "Option 1", 3 participants "Option 2" and 1 
participant "Option 3". If, in fact 6 participants chose "Option 1", 3 participants "Option 2" and 1 
participant "Option 3" you will obtain: 
Experimental Points in PART 2 = 20   0.01 * [(6 6)²+(3 3)²+(1 1)²]= 20.  
 
  In one table, you write that 2 participants choose "Option 1", 4 participants "Option 2" and 4 
participants "Option 3". If, in fact in that table 8 participants chose "Option 1", 2 participants "Option 
2" and 0 participants "Option 3" you will obtain: 
Experimental Points in PART 2 = 20   0.01 * [(2 8)²+(4 2)²+(4 0)²]= 14.4. 
 
  In one table, you write that 0 participants choose "Option 1", 10 participants "Option 2" and 0 
participants  "Option  3".  If,  in  fact  in  that  table  10  participants  chose  "Option  1",  0 participants 
"Option 2" and 0 participants "Option 3" you will obtain: 
Experimental Points in PART 2 = 20   0.01 * [(0 10)²+(10 0)²+(0 0)²]= 0.  
 
Notice that the numbers in the example are just for illustrative purposes. They DO NOT intend 
to suggest how anyone may choose among the different options. 
 
Examples show that with this formula you will never lose experimental points in PART 2, and that 
you can obtain up to 20 experimental points in PART 2. You will earn more money the closer your 
guesses are to the number of participants who actually chose each option. 
 
Once you have entered your guess in a particular table, you should press "OK" and wait for the other 
participants to make their guesses before moving to the next table.  
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Instructions for Deciders’ Task 3 
 
       PART 3 
 
In this final part of the experiment the computer will show you for the last time the 16 tables you 
have already seen, although they might be in a different order. For each table, you are matched with a 
participant from the other classroom (“Receiver”) randomly chosen and different from the one in 
PART 1. 
  
Your task will consist once again in deciding between the three options ("Option 1", "Option2" and 
"Option 3") as you did in PART 1. 
 
The way you (“Decider”) and your matched participant (“Receiver”) will earn experimental points is 
the same as in PART 1 of the experiment. Your payments only depend on your decisions and on the 
randomly chosen table by the computer at the end of the experiment. 
 
The only novelty you will find is that when you now observe each of the tables you will see how 
many  of  the  other  group  of  “Deciders”  actually  chose  each  option  ("Option  1",  "Option2"  and 
"Option 3") in PART 1 of the experiment. 
 
Once you have chosen your option in a particular table, please press "OK" and wait for the other 
participants to make their choice before moving to the next table. 
 
Thank you very much for your participation. 
 
Anonymous Questionnaire filled by all participants 
 
My Experiment Code is: ___________ 
 
1. ¿What do you think about the experiment? 
2. How did you make your choices in each part of the experiment? 
3. How do you think others made their choices in each part of the experiment? 
4. Are you satisfied with your earnings in the experiment? 
5. Gender: 
6: Age. 
7. What do you study? 
8. Would you like to add any other comment? 